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ARTICLES
RACING TOWARDS THE TOP?: THE IMPACT OF CROSS-
LISTINGS AND STOCK MARKET COMPETITION ON
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
John C. Coffee, Jr. *
Cross-listing by foreign issuers onto U.S. exchanges accelerated during
the 1990s, bringing international market centers into competition for listings
and draining liquidity from some regional markets. Although cross-listing
has traditionally been explained as an attempt to break down market segmen-
tation and to increase investor recognition of the cross-listing firm, the global-
ization of financial markets and instantaneous electronic communications
render these explanations increasingly dated. A superior explanation is
"bonding": Issuers migrate to U.S. exchanges because by voluntarily subject-
ing themselves to the United States's higher disclosure standards and greater
threat of enforcement (both by public and private enforcers), they partially
compensate for weak protection of minority investors under their own juris-
dictions' laws and thereby achieve a higher market valuation.
Still, this explanation is also incomplete because many issuers who are
eligible to cross-list do not do so. Increasing evidence suggests that cross-
listing firms differ significantly from firms in the same jurisdictions that do
not cross-list, most notably in that the former have higher growth prospects
and are willing to sacrifice some of the private benefits of control to obtain
equity finance. As a result, specialized markets or market segments seem
likely to persist, each catering to a dfferent clientele of firms.
Cross-listing appears to be producing a new and desirable form of regu-
latory competition. In particular, new "high disclosure" exchanges have ap-
peared that seek to increase the protection for minority shareholders, but they
encountered problems that in part relate to U.S. policy. To encourage this
competition, this Article recommends that the United States rationalize its
currently schizophrenic and inconsistent approach to the foreign issuer,
which approach sometimes waives all governance listing requirements for for-
eign issuers and sometimes subjects them to mandatory and incompatible
governance standards.
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. This paper has been
presented at a variety of workshops and conferences, including the Ninth Annual
Singapore Conference on International Business Law; the Law and Economics Workshop
at Harvard Law School; the 2002 Ibmec Business School conference in S~o Paulo, Brazil;
the 2001 Brookings-Wharton Conference on Financial Services; the 2nd Annual Asian
Corporate Governance Conference in Seoul, Korea in 2002; and Columbia Law School's
Center for International Political Economy 2002 Conference, Global Markets, Domestic
Institutions: Corporate Law and Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals. The
author wishes to acknowledge helpful comments from commentators and participants at
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INTRODUCTION
Today, there are an estimated 150 securities exchanges trading
stocks around the world.' Tomorrow (or at least within the reasonably
foreseeable future), this number is likely to shrink radically. Indeed, this
was the U.S. experience at the beginning of the twentieth century when
over 100 securities exchanges in the United States either consolidated or
simply shut down, as improved communications and transportation sys-
tems lowered the informational cost barriers that had sustained them.
2
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the two great forces re-
shaping the contemporary world-globalization and technology-appear
to be forcing a similar consolidation. 3 Because globalization has lowered
the barriers to cross-border capital flows and because technology has fa-
cilitated instantaneous information flows, securities markets can now
compete on a global basis that previously was infeasible. As a result, issu-
1. For this estimate, see Craig Karmin et al., Vision Test: Nasdaq's Drive to Build
Global Exchange Hits Some Major Potholes, Wall St. J., June 25, 2001, at Al [hereinafter
Karmin et al., Vision Test]. The term "exchange" is defined in section 3(a)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934). The actual
functions performed by an exchange have been the subject of much academic writing. See
generally Ruben Lee, What Is an Exchange? The Automation, Management, and
Regulation of Financial Markets (1998) (describing the range of functions performed by
exchanges and the potential for competitive substitutes). For purposes of this Article,
neither the statutory definition of an exchange nor the legal differences among exchanges
and other market centers, such as electronic communications systems (ECNs), is
important, and the term "exchange" will be used in its ordinary sense of a market center.
2. During the nineteenth century, approximately 250 different stock exchanges
operated in the United States, with most sheltered from competition by geographic and
communication barriers. R.C. Michie, The London and New York Stock Exchanges:
1850-1914, at 167 (1987). As late as 1900, over 100 stock exchanges were still functioning
in the United States. Marshall Blume et al., Revolution on Wall Street 30 (1993). Their
survival into the twentieth century was a direct function of both the high cost of long
distance communications and the costly and cumbersome settlement process, which
required physical delivery of the stock certificates. Id. Technological innovations in the
late nineteenth century (most notably, the telephone, the stock ticker, and, earlier, the
telegraph) reduced these cost barriers and resulted in more efficient national exchanges
absorbing or eliminating smaller local exchanges.
3. The impact of stock migration and cross-listings has been clearest on exchanges in
emerging markets. Within these markets, a few large companies often account for a
majority of the trading volume, and their migration to international exchanges drains
liquidity from the local market, leaving its viability uncertain. See Stijn Claessens et al.,
Explaining the Migration of Stocks from Emerging Economies to International Centers
18-19 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2816, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_|D296960_code020116500.pdPabstractid=296960 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Claessens et al., Migration]; see also infra notes
51-64 and accompanying text.
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ers, particularly those in emerging economies, have a choice of markets
on which to list their securities and raise equity capital.
As with consolidation in other markets, competition among securi-
ties markets leads to a wave of mergers and affiliations, as the principal
players seek to increase their market share. This process is already well
underway. 4 But where does this process end? Some who have studied
this new competition have assumed that the winners (or at least the survi-
vors) in this consolidation process will be those who can offer the greatest
liquidity, the lowest trading costs, or the most advanced technology.
5
They believe that this competition inherently will result in a "winner-
takes-all" contest that will leave only a few large pools of liquidity in major
international financial centers. 6 The premise here is that "liquidity at-
tracts liquidity,"7 and thus larger markets should drain order flow and
liquidity from smaller markets, ultimately leaving them hollowed out
shells.
4. Euronext, the second largest European securities market with a market
capitalization of $2.4 trillion, was the product of a September 2000 merger of the Paris,
Amsterdam, and Brussels exchanges. A newly privatized exchange, Euronext made a
public offering of its shares in July 2001. Norman S. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the
United States and Europe: Automation, Globalization, and Consolidation, 22 U. Pa.J. Int'l
Econ. L. 497, 504-05 (2001). Europe's first and third largest exchanges are the London
Stock Exchange (LSE), with a market capitalization of roughly $2.9 trillion, and the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange, with a market capitalization of $1.4 trillion, which is in turn
owned by the Deutsche Borse, an affiliate of Deutsche Bank. A London/Frankfurt merger
was negotiated in 2000, but was abandoned in September 2000, following the
announcement of a hostile bid for the LSE by OM Gruppen, Inc., the owner of the
Stockholm Stock Exchange. See id. at 502-05. In addition to mergers and proposed
mergers, there have also been strategic alliances between exchanges. A leading example is
Norex, an affiliation of the Stockholm and Copenhagen exchanges in which several other
Baltic markets now participate. See id. at 506. See generally Alberto Cybo-Ottone et al.,
Recent Development in the Structure of Securities Markets, in Brookings-Wharton Papers
on Financial Services 2000, at 223 (Robert E. Litan & Anthony M. Santomero eds. 2000)
(analyzing the recent alliances and consolidation of some international exchanges within
the European Union and the United States and assessing the outlook for further
consolidation); Claessens et al., Migration, supra note 3 (discussing the growing migration
of listings and trading to international exchanges).
5. This short list does not exhaust the ways in which market centers can compete. For
example, exchanges also have very different clearance and settlement systems. Some
markets are "quote driven" (that is, dealers compete by offering rival quotes for the same
security), while others are increasingly "order driven" (that is, orders flow to a central
location and interact, possibly through the mechanism of a specialist acting as atctioneer).
Some are non-profit membership organizations, while increasingly more have been
demutualized and are privately owned. See Poser, supra note 4, at 514-16, 518-28.
6. Viewing exchanges as a kind of natural monopoly, these theorists argue that large
pools of liquidity in major markets will exercise a vacuum cleaner-like effect that drains
smaller markets in order to concentrate liqtidity in a few major markets. See, e.g.,
Carmine Di Noia, Competition and Integration Among Stock Exchanges in Europe:
Network Effects, Implicit Mergers and Remote Access, 7 Eur. Fin. Mgmt. 39, 42 (2001)
(arguing that, as a matter of theory, competition will restlt in "only one exchange
surviv[ing]," except when exchanges form alliances to avoid competition).
7. See id. at 55.
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This Article resists the claim that competition will produce uniform-
ity or any single winner. Although trading costs, liquidity, and technology
will certainly influence the competition for order flow, their relative im-
pact cannot sensibly be assessed until one addresses a prior question:
Why do issuers cross-list in the first place? The more closely one exam-
ines the actual motives and behavior of both those firms that do cross-list
and those that do not, the more one finds that issuers are motivated or
deterred by considerations of corporate governance and access to equity
finance. As a result, because cross-listing on a U.S. exchange commits an
issuer to at least some marginal change in its governance and disclosure
practices, a deeper regulatory competition over governance and disclo-
sure philosophies thus underlies the surface cross-border competition
among market centers for listings and trading volume. Competition
need not, however, drive corporate governance in a single direction. If
firms have different preferences, competition can result in greater spe-
cialization, rather than uniformity. At present, however, the available evi-
dence suggests that regulatory competition, as it actually has developed,
will (1) restrain the centralizing forces that others see as leading to a
natural monopoly of a few dominant "super-exchanges," (2) encourage
private action by firms seeking to distinguish themselves from the herd,
and (3) result in the enhanced protection of minority shareholders.
At this point, definitions become critical. Although the term "regula-
tory competition" has been much used in recent debates over securities
regulation," competition among regulatory systems can take very differ-
ent forms. Academic proponents of regulatory competition have con-
ceived of it as a struggle to eliminate or prune excess regulation. These
proponents, both convinced that securities markets are often overregu-
lated and skeptical of the motives of public regulators, have advocated a
system of "issuer choice" under which each issuer could choose the regu-
latory regime under which its securities would trade.9 Thus, issuers incor-
8. Theories about "regulatory competition" trace back to a classic 1956 article by
Charles Tiebout. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol.
Econ. 416 (1956). While Tiebout's model essentially applied to the provision of public
goods, it was quickly and logically applied by others to the private market and the
regulation of business firms.
9. Typically, proponents of "issuer choice" view this approach as initiating a process of
regulatory arbitrage that would pare back excessive over-regulation. See, e.g., Roberta
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale
L.J. 2359, 2427 (1998) (advocating "competitive federalism" as system under which firms
select their securities regulator from among U.S. jurisdictions and foreign nations);
StephenJ. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903, 922-24 (1998) (advocating "portable
reciprocity" regime under which securities issuer selects from among several countries'
regulatory regimes). For the latest statement of Professor Romano's views, see generally
Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2
Theoretical Inquiries L. 387 (2001). Others have emphatically disagreed. See, e.g.,
Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not
Investor Empowerment, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1338-41 (1999) (arguing that issuer choice
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porated in a U.S. jurisdiction and trading on the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE) could elect to have their disclosure standards determined
by the laws of India, Taiwan, or Switzerland. By forcing different regula-
tory regimes into competition, "issuer choice," in the view of its propo-
nents, would enable firms to engage in a regulatory arbitrage that would
thereby purge out-of-date or inefficient regulation from the legal system,
leaving only that degree of regulation that sophisticated market partici-
pants would design for themselves.
Yet the regulatory competition that in fact has developed involves
not issuers choosing a regulatory regime from a menu of available op-
tions, but issuers cross-listing on an international securities market-and
thereby opting into additional and usually higher disclosure and corpo-
rate governance standards. Two critical differences distinguish this sys-
tem from the "issuer choice" model. First, issuers choose a market and a
regulatory regime together, and cannot sever their choice of market from
their choice of regulatory principles. Thus, issuers cannot enter a deep
and developed market while observing only the laws governing a thin or
primitive market."' Second, issuers cannot "exit" their home jurisdic-
tions in a manner that truly escapes those jurisdictions' potentially more
stringent regulations. '
Under these conditions, this Article finds that strong legal standards
today attract, rather than repel, issuers who are cross-listing. Indeed,
when one examines the actual movement of issuers and listings across
jurisdictions, the dominant pattern has been a pronounced migration of
listings and trading to exchanges in jurisdictions that are noted for their
would decrease U.S. economic welfare by leading issuers to disclose at sub-optimal levels).
For Professor Fox's latest statement of his views, see generally Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer
Choice Debate, 2 Theoretical Inquiries L. 563 (2001). A few economists have suggested
that competition among regulatory regimes will produce a "race to the top" toward higher,
more restrictive standards. See, e.g., Steven Huddart et al., Disclosure Requirements and
Stock Exchange Listing Choice in an International Context, 26 J. Acct. & Econ. 237, 260
(1999) (arguing that trading concentrates on high disclosure exchanges prompting
exchanges to engage in "race for the top" in setting disclosure requirements to maximize
trading volume). But still others have disagreed, finding that competition among markets
has already produced a "race to the bottom" and lesser transparency. See, e.g., Robert
Bloomfield & Maureen O'Hara, Can Transparent Markets Survive?, 55 j. Fin. Econ. 425,
452 (2000) (discussing effects of transparency on market behavior and claiming that low-
transparency dealers are able to outcompete more transparent counterparts in many
dimensions including profitability).
10. There is growing evidence that "strong" markets may have developed at least in
part because of strong legal institutions. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
11. Increasingly in the global economy, it may be possible to make such an exit from
the home county'S laws. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information
Economy, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 943, 977-80 (1998) (arguing that increasing ease of exit
from jurisdictions will produce regulatory arbitrage and reduced regulation). But that is
not what is happening in the system of cross-listings that is currently emerging. Rather, the
issuer would continue to disclose to its home country regulator according to its home
country's rules and, in addition, disclose to the exchange on which it cross-lists according
to thatjurisdiction's rules.
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strong protection of minority shareholders.' 2 Even in Europe, where
firms today do possess a substantial degree of "issuer choice"-namely,
the ability to choose the disclosure standards that apply to them-few
firms seem to be opting for the less demanding options, but instead are
voluntarily complying with the highest level of disclosure.' 3 By listing
under the standards of a higher disclosure regime, the migrating firms
enhance their share price and become able to raise additional equity at
lower cost. 14
This finding that migrating firms are opting into stronger, more
mandatory legal standards is, of course, consistent with a new, important,
and controversial academic literature that argues that liquid and deep
securities markets develop only in jurisdictions that protect the rights and
expectations of minority shareholders.' 5  Still, the temptation to
12. See infra notes 21-29, 39-48 and accompanying text.
13. See Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International
Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999-Part 1, 56 Bus. Law., Feb. 2001, at 655
(reporting results of survey showing that, despite availability of issuer choice, few firms
employ it to reduce disclosure obligations).
14. This is consistent with standard economic theory, which has long maintained that
a commitment to higher disclosure reduces the cost of capital. See Douglas W. Diamond
& Robert E. Verracchia, Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital, 46J. Fin. 1325, 1325
(explaining how revealing information to reduce information asymmetry can reduce a
firm's cost of capital by attracting increased demand from large investors due to increased
liquidity of its securities); see also infra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
15. The seminal work of Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer,
and Robert W. Vishny (LLS&V) has established the existence of two rival structures of
share ownership-dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership-and that the
structure of share ownership in a given jurisdiction correlates with significant differences
in the legal protection provided to minority shareholders. See generally Rafael La Porta et
al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54J. Fin. 471 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta et
al., Corporate Ownership] (finding that, except in economies with strong shareholder
protection, relatively few large firms are widely held); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, 106J. Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998) (finding that the concentration of share ownership
in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, supporting a
hypothesis that minority shareholders are unlikely to be influential in countries that fail to
protect their rights). This author remains skeptical as to whether this "legal explanation"
can truly account for the appearance of the separation of ownership and control in Anglo-
American countries. SeeJohn C. Coffee,Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles
of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.j. 1, 9-11
(2001) [hereinafter Coffee, Rise of Dispersed Ownership] (arguing that the early
development of a relatively autonomous and self-regulating private sector in certain
countries-some common law and some civil law-better accounts for stock market
development than do legal differences). However, this author agrees with the thesis that
"law matters" and that minority legal protections can affect share value. See John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Future As History: The Prospects for Global Corporate Convergence in
Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641, 673-74 (1999)
[hereinafter Coffee, The Future As History] (advancing thesis that many firms migrate to
U.S. securities markets as a form of bonding). Nonetheless, the "law matters" literature has
undervalued and tended to ignore the role of private action by individual firms. At
bottom, cross-listing is a form of private action that may be undertaken by many firms to
compensate for weak law in their jturisdictions of incorporation.
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overgeneralize must be resisted here. Even if the need to assure minority
investors that they will be adequately protected underlies the contempo-
rary race among foreign firms to cross-list on U.S. exchanges, one cannot
fairly leap from this conclusion to a broader scenario under which in-
termarket competition produces an all-encompassing, regulatory "race to
the top."' 16 Not only is the world more complicated and path dependent
than such a simple Darwinian competitive model suggests, 17 but, more
importantly, such a scenario misunderstands the normal impact of com-
petition. Put simply, competitive pressures tend to produce not uniform-
ity, but specialization and fragmentation.' 8
Particularly in the case of securities markets, any assumption that
competition will produce uniformity disregards the critical fact that the
universe of firms that use securities markets divides radically into two
groups: those with concentrated ownership and those with dispersed
ownership. 19 Concentrated ownership firms tend to behave differently
than dispersed ownership firms, with the former often acting to maximize
the private benefits of control for their controlling shareholders, while
the latter seek to maximize their share price in the market. As a result, to
16. The terms "race to the top" and "race to the bottom" have become familiar
shorthand expressions in a longstanding academic debate in the United States over
whether inteijurisdictional competition among states for corporate charters produces
more or less efficient legal rules. Compare William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale I.. 663, 705 (1974) (expounding theory that
Delaware has promoted a race to the bottom among states in corporate regulation by
adopting laws that favor managers over shareholders), with Roberta Romano, The Genius
of American Corporate Law 14-24 (1993) (analyzing empirical evidence as showing that
the race is more to the top because the many markets in which firms operate-the capital,
product, and corporate control markets-constrain managers from choosing a legal
regime detrimental to shareholders' interest). In a number of respects, the competition
among market centers for listings is different from the competition among states to grant
corporate franchises, not least of all because the state does not typically increase its own tax
revenues by luring firms to cross-list on its markets.
17. Path dependency postulates that institutions evolve in a manner that is heavily
determined by initial starting points and pre-existing conditions. See Lucian Bebchuk &
Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependency in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52
Stan. L. Rev. 127, 168-69 (1999) (explaining institutional persistence, or path
dependency, in terms of sunk adaptive costs, complementarities, network externalities,
and, most of all, self-interests of those who benefit from the existing system and hence
resist change). While this perspective has been applied by several authors to corporate
structure and evolution, it has not been previously used as a means by which to model the
competition among market centers.
18. For this generalization applied to securities markets, see Marshall E. Blume, The
Structure of the U.S. Equity Markets 3 (Rodney L. White Ctr. for Fin. Res., Working Paper
No. 17-00, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN-1D263033_
code010312130.pdfabstractid=263033 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
("[F] ragmentation is at the heart of competition.").
19. See La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 15, at 491-98, 511
(analyzing ownership of firms in twenty-seven countries, and concluding that while large
corporations in the richest countries tend to be widely held, concentrated ownership of
companies is more common in other countries).
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the extent that firms are the ultimate consumers of exchange listings, 2 °
different types of firms are likely to have correspondingly different atti-
tudes toward migration to exchanges that impose stronger legal protec-
tions for minority shareholders. Specifically, this Article predicts that
those firms that decline to migrate to "high disclosure" exchanges will be
disproportionately those with controlling shareholders who prefer to
maximize their receipt of the private benefits of control rather than to
maximize the share price of their firms' publicly-held minority shares.
Phrased more generally, in a path dependent world, the regulatory
posture of an exchange is likely to be heavily influenced by the structure
of shareholder ownership of the firms traded on it. This conclusion im-
plies, in turn, that different markets will serve different clienteles. Some
may become more transparent and impose higher listing standards in or-
der to foster dispersed ownership, attract portfolio investors, and maxi-
mize the share value of listed companies, while others may persist as
lower cost, relatively opaque exchanges that accommodate firms with
concentrated ownership in which the private benefits of control will re-
main high. As a result, a dual equilibrium becomes possible under which
"high" and "low" disclosure exchanges persist side by side, reflecting the
fact that firms with both concentrated and dispersed ownership will also
persist side by side.
This prediction-that competition should produce not conformity,
but market fragmentation-rests on the assumption that consumers in
the market for exchange services have very different preferences, thereby
inducing this market to increase, rather than decrease, consumer choice,
as competitive pressures also increase. At first glance, this prediction may
seem at variance with the contemporary evidence, which shows that issu-
ers have been delisting from "low disclosure" exchanges and moving to
"high disclosure" exchanges. In particular, European companies have
migrated heavily to U.S. exchanges over recent years, while U.S. compa-
nies have reduced their cross-listings in Europe andJapan. 2 1 Overall, the
20. It is, of course, debatable in many cases whether the listing choice is made to
further the interests of public shareholders or controlling persons (either managers or a
dominant shareholder). If public shareholders determined where firms listed, a regulatory
race to the top would be predictable, because it would maximize share value. Controlling
shareholders are, however, less interested in maximizing the value of the firm's shares in
the public market because they can sell their control block privately for a control premium
and because they stand to receive private benefits from control. Hence, they may resist
greater disclosure or transparency if it interferes with their receipt of private benefits.
21. See Marco Pagano et al., The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies
List Abroad?, 57J. Fin. (forthcoming Dec. 2002) (Ctr. for Studies in Econ. & Fin., Working
Paper No. 28, 2001, at 11-12 & 40 tbl.2), available at bttp://www.dise.unisa.it/WP/
wp28.pdf (presenting statistics on foreign listings of U.S. and European companies; noting
that the number of European companies on foreign listings increased during the years
1986 through 1997, while the number of American companies on foreign listings
decreased during that same period); see also Jackson & Pan, supra note 13, at 684-87
(concluding that few issuers in Europe are opting to utilize lower disclosure standards even
though legally permitted to do so).
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competitive ability of European exchanges to attract foreign listings has
declined, while that of U.S. exchanges has soared.2 2 Yet, as will be seen,
the firms that have migrated to the U.S. market show special characteris-
tics that are not shared by those that have stayed behind.
2
-
This picture becomes even more complex once we recognize that
the process of competition among markets does not end with the deci-
sion of some firms to cross-list abroad. Rather, as national and regional
markets lose liquidity and trading volume to international exchanges, a
political reaction has sometimes followed. In those countries where the
local market has been most adversely affected, legislative and regulatory
reforms have been adopted to enhance governance and disclosure stan-
dards in the hope of stemming the flight of firms and trading to foreign
markets. 24 Where once the legislative extension of voting rights or rights
to share in control premiums would have been opposed by the local se-
curities industry as egalitarian interference with the market, such reforms
now have been championed by this same industry in these countries in an
effort to stem the exodus of trading to overseas markets. 25 This political
response is also a form of regulatory competition, although not the sort
22. Pagano et al., supra note 21, at 1. The authors add, "Interestingly, the European
markets with the highest trading costs, lowest accounting standards and worst shareholder
protection have also fared worst in attracting or retaining foreign listings, and companies
from those countries have been comparatively eager in seeking foreign listings." Id. In
essence, this is a finding that many foreign firms desire to bond. See infra note 26
(defining "bonding").
23. In particular, firms that cross-list in U.S. markets tend to have higher market
valuations, greater leverage, and better earnings prospects than firms that do not cross-list.
See infra notes 130-148 and accompanying text.
24. Since late 2000, significant securities markets reforms have been adopted in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico; in addition, Colombia has revised its regulations
regarding pension funds to encourage more active participation in corporate governance
by institutional shareholders. Chile approved a new tender offer law in late 2001, and
Argentina and Mexico adopted new capital markets laws in 2001. Global Investing: Be
Nice to Minorities in Latin America, Fin. Times, 'July 23, 2001, at 20. After a four-year
struggle, Brazil also approved a compromise statute in 2001 that significantly revised its
corporate governance standards, at least prospectively, in order to enhance the rights of
minority shareholders. John Barham, A Compromise Solution, LatinFinance, Oct. 2001, at
40, 41-42. This Article will also focus on developments in Brazil and Mexico, two countries
that had been especially adversely affected by the exodus of their leading issuers to the
NYSE. See infra notes 200-201, 225 and accompanying text.
25. A good example is supplied by the recent comments of Raymundo Magliano, the
chairman of the Bovespa in Brazil, which is Latin America's largest stock market. A
champion of recent corporate governance reform in Brazil, he was recently quoted by the
New York T7nes, proclaiming: "What we want to do is transform the Bovespa into a market
for all.... We are revolutionaries, and we are going to spark a cultural revolution." Tony
Smith, Stoking a Stock Market "Revolution," N.Y. Times, July 30, 2002, at WI. Yet the
Bovespa has seen its daily average trading voltume fall from around $1 billion in 1997 to
$200 million today, and "[a]botut 40 percent of investors have migrated to American
depository receipts." Id. In consequence, some thirteen Sao Paulo brokerage firms have
closed over the last year. As he concedes, legal reform is an attempt to save a market that is
otherwise losing its liquidity. Id.; see also infra notes 200-224 and accompanying text.
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envisioned by proponents of "issuer choice." As a result, the ability of
controlling shareholders in at least some emerging markets to retain the
traditional private benefits of control may increasingly be challenged. In
short, there is a trade-off: Firms with concentrated ownership may wish
to persist in their traditional system of corporate governance, but the via-
bility of their market is threatened unless the exodus of trading to inter-
national exchanges can be reversed.
Organizationally, this Article is divided into five sections. Part I be-
gins with an overview of developments in the international securities mar-
kets, with a particular focus on the rise and growth of the cross-listing
phenomenon. Part II then turns to the obvious questions that the rapid
growth in international cross-listing poses: Why do firms cross-list? What
is the source of the gains that cross-listing produces for these firms? Two
competing explanations for the cross-listing phenomenon will be as-
sessed: (1) a market segmentation explanation, and (2) a corporate gov-
ernance, or "bonding," hypothesis.2 6 It was once assumed that cross-list-
ing was basically a means of integrating segmented markets and thus
enabling the issuer to access trapped pools of liquidity. 27 A newer inter-
pretation is today emerging that cross-listing may also be a bonding
mechanism by which firms incorporated in jurisdictions with weak protec-
tion of minority rights or poor enforcement mechanisms can voluntarily
subject themselves to higher disclosure standards and stricter enforce-
ment in order to attract investors who would otherwise be reluctant to
invest (or who would discount such stocks to reflect the risk of minority
expropriation). 28 Although both explanations have some validity, the
second, or "bonding," explanation has the greater predictive power for
the future, because the barriers that once segmented markets have
largely eroded (and will continue to do so), thus reducing the need for
issuers to enter distant markets to access trapped pools of liquidity.
Nonetheless, Part II will find that bonding is a complex phenomenon
26. "Bonding" is a term of art in modern institutional law and economics. It refers to
the costs or liabilities that an agent or entrepreneur will incur to assure investors that it will
perform as promised, thereby enabling it to market its securities at a higher price. The
paradigmatic example would be the surety bond purchased by the agent to protect the
firm's shareholder principals. The term was coined in Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3J. Fin. Econ. 305, 325 (1976).
27. This explanation dates back to a well-known article by Robert Merton that
modeled a world segmented into local capital markets. See Robert C. Merton, Presidential
Address: A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information, 42
J. Fin. 483, 485 (1987); see also infra note 86.
28. This author was probably the first to publish this hypothesis. See Coffee, The
Future As History, supra note 15, at 674. Obviously, others may have independently
arrived at the same idea at more or less the same time. See, e.g., Rene M. Stultz,
Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital,J. Applied Corp. Fin., Fall 1999,
at 8, 15 (arguing that globalization allows companies voluntarily to commit to higher
disclosure standards to economize on the costs of raising funds in public capital markets).
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that needs to be unpacked to be properly understood. Significant differ-
ences distinguish those firms that do wish to bond from those that do not.
Parts III and IV assess the changes impacting securities markets glob-
ally and analyze the strategies individual exchanges can pursue to be-
come more successful competitors. Part III focuses on transitional econo-
mies and in particular on the recent introduction of "high disclosure"
exchanges in Europe and Brazil. Surveying the clientele of exchanges
and market centers, Part IV predicts increased specialization among ex-
changes and market centers, as they attempt to serve very different clien-
teles. But it also notes that "higher disclosure" exchanges have encoun-
tered at best mixed success, in part because of the ceiling imposed on
their ability to compete by the relaxed listing standards imposed on for-
eign issuers by U.S. exchanges. That is, although some of these markets
have actually leapfrogged the United States in terms of the governance
and disclosure standards that the United States now mandates for foreign
issuers, they have encountered a ceiling on their ability to upgrade stan-
dards because of the laissez-faire attitude of U.S. exchanges toward for-
eign issuers.
29'
The status quo is, however, about to change. Probably unintention-
ally, the United States has just taken a major and potentially destabilizing
step towards heightened regulatory competition by enacting the Public
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (popu-
larly known as the "Sarbanes-Oxley Act")."(' This legislation, passed in
response to the Enron, WorldCom, and other recent corporate scandals,
imposes important substantive governance standards on issuers listed on
U.S. exchanges, without distinguishing between foreign and domestic is-
suers."' As a result, foreign issuers will seemingly be required to adopt
U.S. governance standards to a new and unanticipated degree. At the
same time, the scandals prompting this legislation may have taken some
of the luster off a listing on a U.S. exchange. These developments seem-
ingly set the stage for a natural experiment that tests the accuracy of the
bonding hypothesis: Will foreign issuers delist in response to these devel-
opments (and, if so, which ones)? Part V examines the new form of regu-
29. The two best examples of such markets are the Neuer Markt in Germany and the
Novo Mercado in Brazil. Each is discussed infra in notes 189-224 and the accompanying
text. Although these efforts have been serious and sustained, it remains unclear whether
they will be successful.
30. See Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
31. In particular, section 301 of the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act of 2002 ("Act") mandates independent audit committees, each of whose
members must satisfy a statutory standard of independence. As discussed later, this will be
a formidable requirement for many European and civil law corporations to satisfy because
they lack independent boards. The Act also requires numerous additional disclosures and
certifications by corporate officers under oath. See infra notes 279-284 and accompanying
text.
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latory competition that appears to be developing and ultimately recom-
mends what it terms an "exitless" model for regulatory competition.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF MARKET COMPETITION
The history of head-to-head intermarket competition among stock
exchanges is conspicuous by its absence. That is, such competition was
and remains rare.32 In the past, most firms simply listed on their home
country exchange, which was generally a public or a quasi-public entity
that possessed a de facto monopoly. Historians can point to a few
counterexamples, but these prove little. For example, in the late nine-
teenth century, the Consolidated Stock and Petroleum Exchange chal-
lenged the NYSE by beginning to trade NYSE-listed stocks, charging lower
commissions in part because it simply used the NYSE's quotes and did not
have to invest in establishing the NYSE's price discovery mechanism.
33
For a while, this tactic worked, but the challenger was eventually driven
out of business by the NYSE's exclusionary practices.3 4 More recently, in
the late 1980s, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) unilaterally began to
quote the major European-listed stocks and quickly gained a dominant
share over the European national exchanges. 35 Essentially, much like the
Consolidated Stock and Petroleum Exchange a century earlier, the LSE
was free-riding on a price discovery process that actually occurred on the
home-country exchanges. By offering a faster execution at lower cost, the
LSE was able to divert a significant percentage of trades to its exchange.
36
The advantage, however, again proved short-lived. The European ex-
changes updated their trading technology,3 7 and, by 2000, the LSE had
32. A distinction needs to be drawn here between competition for listings, which is
intense, and competition for trading supremacy in the same security, which is rare. Thus,
the NYSE, Nasdaq, and the Amex have long competed for listings, but until recently did
not trade the same stocks. Nasdaq and some regional exchanges do now trade NYSE-listed
stocks, but have only a small percentage of such trading. In 2000, the NYSE handled
82.88% of all trading on the consolidated tape of NYSE-listed stocks; the five regional
exchanges processed 8.82%; and Nasdaq captured 8.30%. Blume, supra note 18, at 17.
33. See Di Noia, supra note 6, at 43-44 (citing J. Harold Mulherin et al., Prices as
Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspective,
34J. L. & Econ. 591, 608 (1991)).
34. Formed in 1885, the Consolidated Stock and Petroleum Exchange was a
substantial competitor to the NYSE almost up to World War I, but was eventually defeated
by the NYSE, which sought to prohibit other brokers from trading on its rival. See Michie,
supra note 2, at 204-08, 254-55, 260-61; see also Di Noia, supra note 6, at 43-44.
35. Di Noia, supra note 6, at 44. The LSE did not require the firms it traded to
request listing formally; rather, it proceeded without their request. Id. at 54.
36. See id. at 54.
37. Basically, the European exchanges moved from a call auction procedure to a
faster quote-driven trading technology. Id.
2002] 1769
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
sufficiently fallen behind that it was forced to agree in principle to a
merger with the Frankfurt exchange.-"
Although the LSE's competitive challenge was successfully resisted, it
set off a wave of defensive mergers and alliance building that continues
today. The goal in this process of alliance building has been to erect a
network that both (1) has superior liquidity to its rivals, and (2) is deliber-
ately incompatible with its rivals' networks, thereby excluding members
of rival exchanges or markets. Even once networks are established, how-
ever, the phenomenon of cross-listing may still drain trading from one
network to another, as discussed in the following subsections.
A. Cross-Listing: The Dominant Competitive Technique
By far, the principal mechanism that produces competition among
market centers has been the issuer's decision to cross-list its stock on a
foreign exchange, typically in the United States. Cross-listing on a U.S.
exchange is usually effected by the issuer first establishing a depository
receipts facility (typically, with a major U.S. bank). The bank will hold
shares of the foreign issuer and issue depository receipts to U.S. investors,
who will thereby achieve the convenience of dollar-denominated trading.
These depository receipts then may (or may not) be listed on a U.S. ex-
change or Nasdaq.
During the 1990s, the popularity of American Depository Receipts
(ADRs) soared. In 1990, 352 depository receipt programs from twenty-
four countries were in effect in the United States,-1' but, by 1999, this
number had grown to 1,800 programs from 78 countries 4 0-an increase
of over 500%. At the end of 1999, the combined market capitalization of
these companies exceeded $6 trillion. 41 Correspondingly, the number of
foreign companies listed on the two principal U.S. stock markets (the
NYSE and Nasdaq) grew from 170 in 1990 to over 750 in 2000 (or roughly
a 450% increase). 42 As of April 2001, over 970 non-U.S. firms were listed
38. See Poser, supra note 4, at 502-03 (discussing the LSE's recent problems). The
merger was thwarted by other developments, but the privately owned LSE remains a
potential takeover target today.
39. Stijn Claessens et al., Stock Markets in Transition Economies 17 (World Bank,
Financial Sector Discussion Paper No. 5, 2000), available at http://vw.fee.uva.nl/fim/
PAPERS/Claessens/chapte,'s/stock.markets.htm (on file with the Cotumbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Claessens et al., Stock Markets].
40. Id. A more recent study finds that, as of March 2001, there were 1,951 "active"
depository receipt programs fron 1,524 firms in 80 countries. Claessens et al., Migration,
supra note 3, at 9.
41. Claessens et al., Stock Markets, supra note 39, at 17. In 1999, some $533 billion in
ADRs was listed on the NYSE. Claessens et al., Migration, supra note 3, at 2.
42. Gerald F. Davis & Christopher Marquis, Are U.S. Stock Markets a Pathway to
Global Governance Convergence? 3 (Acad. of Mgmt., Working Paper, 2001) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
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on the NYSE, Nasdaq, or the Amex. 43 During the 1990s, trading of ADRs
grew rapidly, reaching $1,185 billion in 2000. 4 1 While depository receipts
are most commonly used simply to list outstanding securities in a foreign
market, they also provide a vehicle by which to effect primary offerings
pursuant to which the listing firm issues new equity securities in the for-
eign market. During the late 1990s, foreign issuers exploited this possi-
bility. Not only did foreign listings in U.S. markets soar, but the trading
of foreign shares and equity issuances by foreign issuers in the U.S. mar-
kets increased even more dramatically.
45
The impact of cross-listings has been particularly pronounced on the
NYSE. As Table 1 shows, foreign listings on the NYSE have grown from
approximately 2% of all NYSE listings in 1975 and just over 5% in the
early 1990s to nearly 17% today.46 Table 1 also indicates that foreign
listings have more than quadrupled since 1990, while domestic listings on
the NYSE have steadily declined since 1998.
The NYSE's recent inability to attract a net increase in domestic list-
ings, while its foreign listings have soared over the same period, suggests
that a NYSE listing does something for a foreign issuer that it does not do
for a domestic issuer. Within the United States, the NYSE's trading tech-
nology-which still relies on an open outcry system on an actual trading
floor and is significantly less computerized than its chief rival, Nasdaq-
43. Michael Gruson, Global Shares of German Corporations and Their Dual Listings
on the Frankfurt and New York Stock Exchanges, 22 U. Pa.J. Int'l Econ. L. 185, 187 n.2
(2001).
44. See Claessens et al., Migration, supra note 3, at 2. This amount represented 17%
of the trading in the corresponding local markets. Id.
45. In 2000, a total of 23.3 billion shares of non-U.S. stocks was traded on the NYSE,
an increase of 53% from 1999. The dollar value of shares of non-U.S. companies traded
on the NYSE as a percentage of the total value traded rose to 10.3% in 2000, as compared
to 7.7% in 1999. Troy L. Harder, Comment, Searching for a Level Playing Field: The
Internationalization of U.S. Securities Disclosure Rules, 24 HouIs. J. Int'l L. 345, 347 n.5
(2002). Similarly, between 1995 and 2000, over 800 foreign issuers registered their
securities with the SEC. Id. (citing study by SEC's Division of Corporation Finance). Davis
and Marquis report that the total equity capital raised in the United States through the
issuance of depository receipts during the 1990s was $133 billion. See Davis & Marquis,
supra note 42, at 3. Finally, in 2000, some $29 billion was raised in new equity through 115
depository receipts offerings in the U.S. and European markets, a 32% increase over 1999.
Claessens et al., Migration, supra note 3, at 2.
All this is in sharp contrast to the European experience over the same interval. U.S.
cross-listings on European exchanges declined over the 1986 to 1997 interval, and foreign
firms cross-listing on European exchanges did not make subsequent equity offerings at a
higher rate than a control group. See Pagano et al., supra note 2t, at 11-12.
46. This table is an updated version of a table originally prepared by Professors
Jonathan R. Mace), and Maureen O'Hara, but has been extended to cover later years.
Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Economics of Stock Exchange Listing Fees
and Listing Requirements, 11 J. Fin. Intermediation 297, 302 (2002). Data for 2001 and
2002 have been added from the NYSE's web site. NYSE, Complete List of Non-U.S.
Companies-2001, at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/forlist0209.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); NYSE, Quick Facts: NYSE Press Room (July 31, 2002), at http://




FOREIGN LISTED COMPANIES ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
Foreign Listings as
Year Total Listings Foreign Domestic Percentage of Total Listings
1975 1,557 33 1,524 02.12%
1980 1,570 37 1,533 02.35%
1985 1,541 54 1,487 03.5%
1990 1,774 96 1,678 05.4%
1991 1,885 105 1,780 05.6%
1992 2,089 120 1,969 05.7%
1993 2,361 153 2,208 06.5%
1994 2,570 216 2,354 08.4%
1995 2,675 247 2,428 09.0%
1996 2,907 304 2,603 10.5%
1997 3,047 356 2,691 11.7%
1998 3,114 379 2,735 12.2%
1999 3,025 406 2,619 13.4%
2000 2,862 434 2,428 15.2%
2001 2,798 462 2,336 16.5%
July 1, 2002 2,796 468 2,328 16.7%
strikes many as relatively antiquated, 47 and firms listed on Nasdaq have
shown less interest in recent years in moving up to the NYSE once eligible
for listing there. But for the foreign issuer, the NYSE still offers a critical
advantage: its reputation as the leading repository of high disclosure
standards and market transparency. Here, it clearly outranks its leading
international competitor for listings, the LSE. 48 The NYSE's relative suc-
cess against the LSE suggests that reputation may be more important
than technology-at least for firms that cross-list.
Why did the rate of foreign listings in the United States suddenly
accelerate in the 1990s? To some extent, the sudden growth in popular-
ity of ADRs in the early 1990s was a consequence of state privatizations of
formerly state-owned enterprises, which swept across Europe and South
America beginning in the late 1980s. Prior to this time, depository re-
47. For this assessment, see Cybo-Ottone et al., supra note 4, at 263. Although the
NYSE has a significantly greater market capitalization than the LSE ($12.4 trillion versus
$2.9 trillion), the LSE lists many more securities (over 12,000). See Poser, supra note 4, at
500-02. Unlike the NYSE, the LSE has not sought to emphasize higher listing or
disclosure standards as a competitive strategy.
48. Cybo-Ottone, Di Noia, and Murgia offer the assessment that "listing on NYSE
seems to signal commitment to a shareholder value approach," which the listing foreign
firm often advertises in the press. Cybo-Ottone et al., supra note 4, at 263. In contrast,
listing on the LSE carries no such signal and is not advertised by firms listing thereon. A
cross-listing on the NYSE also leads to a substantially greater increase in analyst coverage
than does a listing on the LSE. See H. Kent Baker et. al., International Cross-Listing and
Visibility, 37J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 495, 498 (2002). Finally, a listing on the NYSE
costs substantially more, both initially and annually, than a cost-listing on the LSE. Id. at
499-500. Hence, to.jtstify paying more, firms cross-listing on the NYSE must expect to
gain more than from a similar listing on the LSE.
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ceipt programs were typically used to facilitate over-the-counter trading
and, in most cases, were not associated with a listing on the NYSE, Nas-
daq, or a contemporaneous equity offering in the United States. Yet
these privatization offerings were often so large as to necessitate access to
the world's largest capital market in the United States. Once these offer-
ing techniques were developed, they were increasingly copied later in the
1990s by already private companies.
More generally, however, there was a worldwide explosive growth in
stock market capitalization during the 1990s. This growth is best mea-
sured in terms of the ratio of market capitalization to gross domestic
product (GDP). A recent World Bank study finds that this ratio increased
from a mean of 31% in 1990 to 62% in 2000, and from a median of 18%
in 1990 to 34% in 2000.49 While rich countries outperformed poor coun-
tries, 50 the direction was positive everywhere.
1. The Impact on Local Markets. - As stock markets grew exponen-
tially during the 1990s, firms listed in the local market also listed abroad.
Indeed, the ratio of market capitalization listed abroad to total market
capitalization rose even more dramatically than did the ratio of market
capitalization to GDP, particularly in emerging markets. 51 Although a
foreign listing does not necessarily imply that trading will also shift to the
foreign market, trading during the 1990s did in fact follow the migration
of listings, at least in the case of "middle-income" countries (which cate-
gory includes most emerging market economies in Asia and Latin
America). For these nations, the ratio of trading abroad to total trading
rose over the 1990s "from a few percentage points to some 40 percent in
2000."52 Obviously, this growth in foreign trading represents a significant
loss to the local securities industry, which at some point could imperil the
liquidity of the local market.
On the positive side of the ledger, foreign listings enabled firms in
emerging markets to raise vast amounts of equity capital. In 2000 alone,
$29 billion in new equity was raised through some 115 depository receipt
offerings in the U.S. and European markets.5 3 For "middle-income"
countries, the majority of equity had been raised domestically up until
the mid-1990s, but after that point equity raised abroad began to vastly
49. Claessens et al., Migration, supra note 3, at 11. This growth reflected both prices
for existing stocks and new listings.
50. The highest ratio of market capitalization to GDP was in Hong Kong, where it was
383% in 2000, and the lowest ratio was in Bangladesh, where it was only 2.5%. Id.
51. The World Bank study finds that this growth was the highest in what it terms
"middle-income" countries (such as much of East Asia and Latin America). In "middle-
income" countries, the ratio of market capitalization listed abroad to total capitalization
increased from single digit numbers in 1989 to a peak of over 62% in 1999. Id. at 12. This
ratio declined to around 50% in 2000. Id. at 26 fig.2.
52. Id. at 13.
53. Id. at 2.
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exceed the equity raised domestically, with the foreign to domestic ratio
peaking at 3.7:1 in 2000.
54
On the other side of the ledger, the adverse impact on local markets
from cross-listings comes into clearest focus when we examine the special
case of Latin American markets. In 1989, only two Latin American com-
panies were cross-listed in U.S. markets, but byJanuary 1999, this number
had grown to 106.55 This growth seems best explained by the fact that
companies found, over this period, that cross-listing increased the value
of their firms and enhanced the liquidity of their stock.56 Indeed, the
market capitalization of the four principal Latin American stock ex-
changes soared from $66 billion in 1990 to $434 billion in 1996 (or over
650%) .57
Along the way, however, something else happened: Stock turnover
increased, and trading migrated from Latin American countries to the
United States. By mid-1995, stocks representing over 87%, 54%, 62%,
and 71% of the Mexican, Argentine, Chilean, and Brazilian stock market
indices, respectively, were listed through ADRs in the United States. 58
Even more dramatically, trading moved to the United States, as Table 2
shows.
TABLE 2
GROWrH IN U.S. TRADING IN PROPORTION TO DOMESTIC
TRADING (IN $ MILLIONS)
59
1990 1993 1994 1995 1996
Argentina
Domestic trading value: 852 10,339 11,372 4,594 4,382
U.S. trading value: 0 6,125 12,612 15,679 12,445
Turnover ratio (%) 26.1 37.4 65.0 53.6 37.7
Brazil
Domestic trading value: 5,598 57,409 109,498 79,186 112,108
U.S. trading value: 0 96 284 3,284 25,801
Turnover ratio (%) 34.2 57.8 58.0 55.9 63.2
Chile
Domestic trading value: 783 2,796 5,263 11,072 8,460
U.S. trading value: 92 2,369 7,210 11,600 9,584
Turnover ratio (%) 6.4 11.6 18.3 30.7 27.3
Mexico
Domestic trading value: 12,212 62,454 82,964 34,377 43,040
U.S. trading value: 2,577 37,307 83,496 54,400 29,391
Iurnover ratio (%) 45.2 49.7 127.8 97.9 67.9
54. Id. at 13, 27 fig.3.
55. Kent Hargis, International Cross-listing and Stock Market Development in
Emerging Economies, 9 int'l Rev. Econ. & Fin. 101, 101 (2000).
56. Darius P. Miller, The Market Reaction to International Cross-Listings: Evidence
from Depositary Receipts, 51 J. Fin. Econ. 103, 113 (1999).
57. Hargis, supra note 55, at 102.
58. Id. at 103.
59. This table is taken firor a fuller table in Hargis. Id. at 102 tbl.l.
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If one looks at the pivotal year 1995, one sees that the value of Mexi-
can, Argentine, and Chilean ADRs traded in the United States was
greater than the total value of all stocks traded in their respective domes-
tic markets during that year.6 1 Although Brazil may have seemed rela-
tively exempt from this trend in the above table, the picture changed
dramatically in the latter half of the decade. As of 1997, the Sdio Paulo
Stock Exchange (Bovespa), the largest Brazilian stock exchange, had a
volume roughly equal to that of the Toronto Stock Exchange, but, by
2001, its trading volume had fallen to one-sixth of that of the Canadian
exchange. 6' Indeed, daily trading volume on Bovespa fell by over 80%
from $1 billion to $150 million. 62 In part, this decline reflected the en-
actment in Brazil of an unpopular stock transfer tax that made trading on
the NYSE cheaper., 3 But, as most Brazilian commentators recognized,
the stagnation of Brazil's capital markets and its inability to finance initial
public offerings was primarily explained by the inadequacy of investor
protections for minority shareholders.
6 4
2. Who Cross-Lists? - The evidence shows that firms establishing de-
pository facilities in the United States come heavily from emerging mar-
ket economies. One recent study found that 73% of non-U.S. companies
establishing such facilities were from emerging markets."65 In 2001, when
ADR issuances fell sharply in the wake of terrorism and uncertainty,
emerging market issuers again accounted for 73% of new ADR issuances,
with Asian companies representing more than half this total."6 A basic
difference also seems to distinguish the motivation for cross-listings: Eu-
60. This table understates the full migration of trading to the United States because it
compares the trading in the security that cross-lists to the total trading of all securities in
the home country. Other studies that have focused just on trading in the securities
covered by depository programs have found that as much as 75% of the trading in those
securities shifts to the United States. See lan Domowitz et al., International Cross-Listing
and Order Flow Migration: Evidence From an Emerging Market, 53J. Fin. 2001, 2002
(1998) ("[F]oreign listing is likely to have a significant impact on the domestic Mexican
market because foreign investors (mostly U.S. nationals) account for more than 27 percent
of holdings and up to 75 percent of trading in our sample period.").
61. Raymond Colitt, Brazil Pins Its Hopes on Reform, Fin. Times, Nov. 1, 2001, at 46
[hereinafter Colitt, Reform]; Smith, supra note 25.
62. Raymond Colitt, Brazil Aims to Boost Capital Markets, Fin. Times, Oct. 17, 2001,
at 14 [hereinafter Colitt, Capital Markets]. By 2002, the daily trading average had climbed
back to $200 million, which still represents an 80% decline. Smith, supra note 25.
63. Smith, supra note 25. The transfer tax amounted to 0.38% of the value of each
stock exchange transaction. Colitt, Capital Markets, supra note 62.
64. This is the principal causal explanation given by the President of Brazil's capital
markets regulatory agency. See Jose Luis Os6rio, Committed to Reform, LatinFinance,
Nov. 2001, at 56, 56. Mr. Os6rio is President of Brazil's Commiss5o De Valores Mobiliirios
(CVM), the Brazilian equivalent of the American Securities and Exchange Commission.
The author also interviewed Mr. Os6rio in Si.o Paulo in April 2002.
65. Miller, supra note 56, at 104 (noting that 209 of 289 issuers establishing sponsored
depository receipt facilities in 1994 were from emerging market countries).
66. Craig Karmin, Foreign Concerns' New Issuance of ADRs Fell Sharply This Year,
Wall St.J., Dec. 19, 2001, at C13.
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ropean countries often cross-list in the United States to gain a currency
with which they can make stock-for-stock acquisitions of U.S. companies,
whereas emerging market companies tend to be interested primarily in
raising equity capital. 67 At least for emerging market issuers, the deposi-
tory receipt market, which is heavily concentrated in the United States, is
the principal source of equity capital.6 8
In this light, the Latin American experience, which saw much of the
trading in its markets also move to the United States in the wake of the
earlier migration of listings, could prove prophetic for other emerging
market issuers, but not for European issuers. On the other hand, Latin
America may be unique in that trading on its exchanges overlaps in time
closely with the trading hours of U.S. markets, 69 which may make Latin
American markets uniquely vulnerable to the loss of trading to a domi-
nant market in its same time zone.
7 °
Although relative transfer taxes and the overlap in trading hours
probably explain some of the trading loss that Latin American markets
have recently experienced, they cannot be assigned the primary causal
role for the stagnation in these markets. The chairman of Brazil's capital
markets regulatory agency notes that, during the 1990s, Brazil averaged
primary equity issuances of only $1 billion per year, but received foreign
direct investment of $30 billion per year.71 This 30:1 ratio reflects, he
concludes, basic weaknesses in Brazilian corporate governance that leave
foreign investors willing to invest as partners or joint venturers in Brazil-
ian economic opportunities, but not as minority shareholders.
72
Yet if Latin American firms cannot raise equity capital in their own
markets, they may be able to raise it in the U.S. market, as next discussed.
B. IPOs in International Markets
Issuers can go one step beyond cross-listing on a foreign exchange;
they can do their initial public offering and listing on such an exchange
and simply ignore their host country exchanges. This would not seem a
67. Id.
68. By one estimate, in 1994, 77% of the total equity capital raised by firms in
emerging market countries was raised in the depository receipt market. Vihang R. Errunza
& Darius P. Miller, Market Segmentation and the Cost of Capital in International Equity
Markets, 35 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 577, 581 (2000).
69. For example, the Mexican market is open from 9:30 AM to 5:00 IM EST in the
United States and thus fully overlaps with trading on the NYSE and Nasdaq. See Domowitz
et al., supra note 60, at 2003.
70. See generally Melek Pulatkonak & George Sofianos, The Distribution of Global
Trading in NYSE-Listed Non-U.S. Stocks (NYSE, Working Paper No. 99-03, 1999) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that a market's "time-zone distance from the U.S."
best predicts the likelihood that trading will flow back to the United States; that is, markets
within, or near, U.S. time zones will experience the largest trading volume loss because of
cross-listing).
71. Os6rio, supra note 64, at 56.
72. Id.
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logical step for most young companies because they have greater visibility
in their home countries, where price discovery can naturally occur more
quickly and with lower transaction costs. Still, it may be a necessary step if
their home countries cannot sustain liquid and active equity markets.
The clearest illustration of issuers in one country adopting a foreign
market for their initial public offerings is supplied by Israel. Over the last
decade, young Israeli companies have in large numbers forsaken their
home exchange, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, and done their initial pub-
lic offerings on Nasdaq in the United States. Nasdaq currently lists
ninety-six Israeli companies, "more companies than from any other coun-
try outside of North America," and the dollar value of equity trading in
Israeli stocks was estimated to be $44 billion in 1999. 7 3 Since 1995, at
least 88% of all equity capital raised by Israeli firms was done through
offerings on Nasdaq.7 4 Consequently, Israel has the highest ratio of for-
eign to domestic market capitalization: 95.7% in 2000. 7 5 In effect, it has
largely piggybacked on U.S. markets rather than developing its own.
Why do these Israeli companies ignore their home country exchange
(or at least accord it little active role)? Professor Edward Rock has ex-
amined these offerings and found a common denominator: "Without ex-
ception, the audience is a relatively small group of U.S. institutional inves-
tors."76 In effect, these offerings are marketed to a small group of U.S.
institutional investors, ten of whom might easily control a majority of the
firm's shares. In addition, the venture capitalists who originally financed
the infant firm (typically, a collection of U.S. and Israeli firms) had them-
selves obtained much of their capital from U.S.-based venture capital in-
vestors, with the result that beneficial ownership was in effect being trans-
ferred upon the IPO from one cohesive group of largely U.S. owners to
another such group by means of Nasdaq. Moreover, some of these Israeli
issuers have actually incorporated in the United States, where they typi-
cally have significant operations and market their products.
In this light, the Israeli example does not demonstrate that other
young companies can adopt the U.S. market and abandon their own.
Rather, these Israeli companies were already highly integrated into the
U.S. corporate governance system. The Israeli experience instead under-
scores that access to equity capital on the attractive, one-stop basis devel-
oped by Israeli firms may require significant prior accommodation to
U.S. governance norms and expectations.
73. Edward B. Rock, Greenhorns, Yankees, and Cosmopolitans: Venture Capital,
IPOs, Foreign Firms, and U.S. Markets, 2 Theoretical Inquiries L. 711, 717 (2001) (quoting
Nasdaq's website).
74. Id.
75. See Claessens et al., Migration, supra note 3, at 12.
76. Rock, supra note 73, at 725.
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C. Satellite Markets and Market Networks
A final mechanism for increased competition among market centers
involves the unusual act of bringing the mountain to Mohammed:
namely, exporting the international market to other areas of the world
through satellite operations or a network of affiliations. This approach
requires significant start-up and operating costs and thus might be be-
yond the financial capacity of many exchanges, which generally have lim-
ited capital resources.
Nonetheless, one U.S. market-Nasdaq-has aggressively sought to
expand on a global basis, establishing major subsidiary markets in Europe
and Japan.77 Its announced goal has been to create an integrated global
marketplace that would offer round-the-clock trading, and its timetable
has been to link its Asian and European outposts with its U.S. trading
operations by 2003.78 However, its success to date has been limited at
best. For example, Nasdaq recently decided to close its Japanese market
by the end of 2 002 .
7
9 What explains Nasdaq's inability to achieve a
broader acceptance despite its strong brand name? The prevailing inter-
pretation appears to be that, as an outsider, it has inevitably encountered
resistance from entrenched interests within the local region.8 0
In this light, the alternative and more logical means of extending the
competitive range of an exchange may be to buy, merge, or affiliate with
the leading local exchange. This appears to be the NYSE's strategy: to
negotiate affiliations with other exchanges and seek cross-listings. 8 ' Prob-
ably the leading example of growth through merger is Euronext, a combi-
nation of the Paris, Amsterdam, and Brussels exchanges, which the Lis-
bon exchange is also scheduled to join in 2002. 8 2 Almost concomitantly
with the creation of Euronext, the Deutsche Borse and the LSE negoti-
ated a similar merger, only to see it ultimately collapse over control is-
sues. OM Gruppen Inc., the owner of the Swedish exchange, later made
an unsuccessful hostile bid for the LSE,13 thereby foreshadowing the like-
lihood that as exchanges are privatized their control may become increas-
ingly contestable in the market.
Market consolidation-either through mergers or, more likely,
through network alliances-seems the most probable scenario for the fu-
ture, with relatively few exchanges seeking to cross national borders and
establish outposts in foreign jurisdictions. Over the near future, affilia-
tions among market centers may increase and begin to be negotiated
77. See Karmin et al., Vision Test, supra note 1.
78. Id.
79. See Phred Dvorak & Craig Karmin, Nasdaq Japan: Failure Carries Many Aspects,
Wall St.J., Aug. 19, 2002, at Cl.
80. Id.; see also Karmin et al., Vision Test, supra note 1.
81. Karmin et al., Vision Test, supra note I (quoting NYSE Chairman Richard Grasso,
who stated, "We're not going to plant our flag in Tokyo.").
82. Id.
83. For a brief overview of these developments, see Poser, supra note 4, at 502-04.
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with the same competitive intensity as were diplomatic alliances in the
nineteenth century-in both cases based primarily on the fear that those
who are left out will become the most vulnerable.
II. WHY Do FIRms CROSS-LIST?: THE COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
To this point, it has been argued that cross-listing is a dynamic and
destabilizing force that has moved liquidity from local exchanges to inter-
national "super-markets," thereby impelling a consolidation among mar-
ket centers. But this explanation leads to an obvious further question:
What motivates firms to cross-list?
The answer may seem apparent: Firms can increase their value
through cross-listing. The evidence here is relatively clear.8 4 But this an-
swer only leads to a further question: Why do stock prices increase when
firms cross-list? Here, there are two competing explanations, one old and
one new. The traditional explanation was that cross-listing broke down
market segmentations and allowed the firm to reach trapped pools of
liquidity.8 5 Segmentation of markets because of investment barriers (e.g.,
taxes, regulatory restrictions, or informational constraints) creates an in-
centive for firms to cross-list in order to achieve market integration. Eco-
nomic theory has long suggested that stock prices should rise for firms in
segmented markets that cross-list.8 6 A variation on this basic theory has
suggested that, as cross-listing increases the shareholder base, the firm's
risk is shared among more shareholders, and this increased diversifica-
tion reduces the firm's cost of capital.8 7 For a time, the empirical evi-
dence seemed to confirm this explanation because the stock prices of
84. See Miller, supra note 56, at 104; Craig Doidge et al., Why Are Foreign Firms
Listed in the U.S. Worth More? 1-2 (Working Paper, 2001), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID285337_codeO11001100.pdf?abstractid=285337 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding sharply higher valuations and Tobin's q ratios
for foreign firms listed in the United States, even after controlling for various differences);
see also Stephen R. Foerster & G. Andrew Karolyi, The Effects of Market Segmentation and
Investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the United
States, 54J. Fin. 981, 1008 (1987) (indicating firms cross-listing in the United States earn
cumulative abnormal returns of 19% in the year before listing).
85. Foerster & Karolyi, supra note 84, at 1008-09; Narayanan Jayaraman et al., The
Impact of International Cross Listings on Risk and Return: The Evidence From American
Depository Receipts, 17 J. Banking & Fin. 91, 96-97 (1993); Gordon J. Alexander et al.,
Note, Asset Pricing and Dual Listing on Foreign Capital Markets: A Note, 42 J. Fin. 151,
151 (1987).
86. See, e.g., Merton, supra note 27, at 485 (setting forth original theory of market
segmentation's effect); Alexander et al., supra note 85, at 157-58 (arguing that the
expected return on a dually listed security is different from its expected return when it is
listed on a single market). These studies predict, or are at least consistent with a finding,
that cross-listing between two segmented markets leads initially to a higher equilibrium
market price and a lower expected return thereafter.
87. See Foerster & Karolyi, supra note 84, at 988-95 (finding that abnormal returns to
cross-listing firms initially rose, but later declined post-listing).
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cross-listing firms seemed to rise and then decline post-listing.8 8 Until
recently, little evidence suggested that a dual listing actually increased
firm value for the long term. 9
But at least one recent study by Professor Darius Miller ("Miller
Study") has found a different pattern: Cross-listing results in positive ab-
normal returns that are statistically significant and that do not dissipate
post-listing.9 0 Unlike earlier studies, this study focused on the announce-
ment date of the decision to cross-list, not the actual listing date.9 1 The
announcement date is clearly the theoretically more appropriate date be-
cause the market should react to news of the expected improvement, and
frequently there is an appreciable delay between the announcement and
the actual listing. In addition, this study found that the abnormal returns
were considerably greater in magnitude when the firm cross-listed on the
NYSE or Nasdaq than when the firm just established a depository receipt
facility in the United States and listed only on an over-the-counter mar-
ket.9 2 Although these findings are not necessarily inconsistent with the
market segmentation hypothesis, they better fit an alternative hypothesis
that this Article will call the "bonding hypothesis."
A. The Bonding Hypothesis
Essentially, the bonding hypothesis posits that cross-listing on a U.S.
stock exchange (including Nasdaq) commits the listing firm to respect
minority investor rights and to provide fuller disclosure. Listing on a U.S.
exchange does so because (1) the listing firm becomes subject to the en-
forcement powers of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC);
(2) investors acquire the ability to exercise effective and low-cost legal
remedies, such as class actions and derivative actions, that are simply not
available in the firm's home jurisdiction;"'- and (3) entry into the U.S.
markets commits the firm (at least when it lists on an exchange or Nas-
88. Id. at 993-95; see also Alexander et al., supra note 85, at 157-58 (also finding
post-listing decline).
89. See Miller, supra note 56, at 104.
90. Id. The Miller Study utilized a sample consisting of 181 foreign issuers that
announced their first depository receipts program between 1985 and 1995. Id. at 108.
91. Id. at 105.
92. Id. at 104. Miller indicated that "abnormal returns largest for firms that list on
major U.S. exchanges such NYSE or NASDAQ, rather than on OTC 'pink sheets' or
PORTAL." Id.
93. Very few other jurisdictions recognize the class action, and virtually none has any
experience with it in the securities law context. Equally important, U.S. law accepts the
contingent fee and the practice of awarding relatively high fee awards to the successful
attorney in a class action. Finally, the "American Rule" on fee shifting, tinder which each
side generally bears its own expenses, means that an unsuccessful plaintiff does not face
liability for the defendant's typically greater expenses. All these elements combine to
create an entrepreneurial system of private enforcement in the United States that is not
paralleled elsewhere. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Coltim. L. Rev. 669, 677-84 (1986) (analyzing the unique
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daq) to provide fuller financial information in response to SEC require-
ments and to reconcile its financial statements with U.S. generally ac-
cepted accounting principles (GAAP) .94
Beyond these strictly legal requirements, entry into the U.S. equity
markets exposes the foreign issuer to the scrutiny of "reputational in-
termediaries," including U.S. underwriters (if the issuer undertakes an
initial public offering in the United States, as is frequently the case), audi-
tors, debt rating agencies, and securities analysts. 95 Analysts can reasona-
bly be viewed as financial watchdogs who should be at least as skillful as
public regulators in uncovering financial chicanery, and hence a firm
that subjects itself to their scrutiny is arguably "bonding" its promise to
make full and fair disclosure. The foreign issuer also becomes subject to
any listing requirements imposed by the U.S. exchange on which it lists.
Although U.S. exchanges do impose significant corporate governance re-
legal rules in the United States that give rise to an entrepreneurial system of private
enforcement).
94. Although there have been hints of forthcoming change, the SEC continues to
require foreign issuers that file financial information with it also to file a reconciliation to
U.S. GAAP, as promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).
International Accounting Standards, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 33-7801, 17 SEC
Docket 1551, 1555 (Feb. 16, 2000). For an overview, see generally Maureen Peyton King,
Note, The SEC's (Changing?) Stance on IAS, 27 Brook. J. Int'l L. 315 (2001) (discussing
SEC's continuing policy of refusing to accept International Accounting Standards as an
alternative to U.S. GAAP). Any issuer, foreign or domestic, that lists on a U.S. exchange is
required to register with the SEC pursuant to section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and to enter the periodic disclosure system established by section 13 of that Act. In
the case of foreign issuers, this obligation requires the filing of Form 20-F. See Form 20-F,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f (2002). Form 20-F must be filed
annually within six months after the end of the issuer's fiscal year. Id.
95. When firms cross-list in the United States, they obtain significantly increased
coverage from securities analysts and more accurate forecasting of future earnings. See
generally Mark H. Lang et al., ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross Listing in the
U.S. Improve a Firm's Information Environment and Increase Market Value? 20 (NYSE,
Working Paper No. 2002-06, Apr. 2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/2002-
06.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that firms that cross-list obtain
greater analyst coverage and their earnings forecasts prove more accurate than those
relating to non-cross-listing firms). Increased analyst attention is not simply a function of
the greater depth and liquidity of U.S. markets. The LSE is also deep and liquid, but a
cross-listing on the LSE does not produce the same level of analyst attention. One recent
study finds that a cross-listing on the NYSE is associated with a 128% increase in the
number of analysts following the firm, whereas a similar listing on the LSE correlates with
only a 48% increase in the average number of analysts following the firm. See H. Kent
Baker et. al., International Cross-Listing and Visibility, 37 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis
495, 498 (2002). Although any explanation of this differential is speculative, it may be that
securities analysts are more prepared to follow firms that make more detailed financial
disclosures, and more extensive disclosures are required to list on the NYSE than on the
LSE. The NYSE, however, also requires a greater market capitalization, and a NYSE listing
entails considerably greater initial and annual costs. Id at 499-500. These greater costs
suggest that non-U.S. firms cross-listing on the NYSE must expect to get more from such a
listing than from a cheaper cross-listing on the LSE, and this expectation is at least
consistent with the bonding thesis.
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quirements on domestic firms that regulate board structure and protect
shareholder voting rights, 96 they have largely waived these substantive
corporate governance requirements in the case of foreign issuers.
97
Morever, the SEC has acquiesced in this pattern. :18 Accordingly, whatever
increase in minority protection that results from listing in the United
States comes almost exclusively from SEC disclosure requirements and
from public and private enforcement, but not from the U.S. exchanges
themselves. Indeed, the broad exemption afforded by U.S. exchanges to
foreign issuers from the listing requirements that they apply to domestic
companies represents a new and important barrier to efforts by emerging
markets to upgrade their corporate governance standards.9'
-
Because the only mandatory changes incident to entering the U.S.
markets relate to disclosure, the bonding hypothesis must postulate that
improved disclosure can be a functional substitute (even if an imperfect
one) for higher substantive standards of corporate governance. To the
extent that this premise is valid, listing in the United States resembles a
bonding mechanism, similar, for example, to the use of sureties or special
monitors, that reduces the potential for the expropriation of minority
investors. This Article will both defend the proposition that enhanced
disclosure can be a second-best substitute for governance reform and ar-
gue that entry into the U.S. markets should require foreign issuers to
meet substantially similar governance standards to those applicable to do-
mestic companies.
96. See infia notes 261-265 and accompanying text.
97. An American Bar Association study, released in 2002, has concluded that "foreign
issuers can easily obtain an exemption from corporate governance listing requirements."
ABA Section of Bus. Law, Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Special Study on Market Structure,
Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 Bus. Law. 1487 (2002) [hereinafter ABA
Special Study]. As a practical matter, all that is required for a waiver from the NYSE's
corporate governance requirements is an opinion from "an independent counsel licensed
in the issuer's home country [that] opines that the issuer's governance practices are not
prohibited in its domicile jurisdiction." Id. at 27. As a result, the NYSE's listing rules that
preclude a domestic issuer from diluting the voting power of minority shareholders, such
as through the subsequent issuance of supervoting stock and other techniques, do not
apply to the foreign issuer, which remains free to engage in such tactics. See infra notes
261-276 and accompanying text. This is an example of the kind of regulatory arbitrage
that even a partial system of "issuer choice" permits. See supra notes 8-10 and
accompanying text.
98. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by
the American Stock Exchanges, Inc. and New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to Amend the
Exchanges' Listing Standards for Foreign Companies, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
24,634, 38 SEC Docket 947, 948, 952 (June 23, 1987); see also Roberta S. Karmel, The
Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. Rev. 325, 333-36
(2001) (discussing waivers from exchange corporate governance requirements available to
foreign firms).
99. For a summary of recent reforms in Latin American emerging markets, see infra
notes 204-229 and accompanying text. This barrier is new principally because emerging
markets have only sought to utilize listing requirements as a means of addressing corporate
governance over the last several years, generally after earlier efforts to secure legislative
reform failed.
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As a matter of theory, the idea that a credible promise of improved
disclosure should produce a positive stock price reaction is neither sur-
prising nor unorthodox. Economic theory has long predicted that the
more credibly a firm commits itself to increased levels of disclosure, the
more that this action should reduce the informational asymmetry compo-
nent of the firm's cost of capital.' 0 0 Empirically, this view has been sup-
ported by a recent notable study's conclusion that, as German firms
switched from German accounting principles to U.S. GAAP or Interna-
tional Accounting Standards (AS), their bid-asked spread declined and
their trading volume increased.'10 Although these converting firms did
not technically "bond" themselves to observe higher standards, they did
make a credible promise to provide superior disclosure, and the market
reacted positively. Similarly, another recent study finds that as foreign
firms cross-list in the United States, they obtain significantly increased
coverage by securities analysts and, as an apparent result, forecasts of
their future earnings become more accurate relative to forecasts of firms
that do not cross-list. 112 Moreover, firm value increases in direct response
to increased analyst coverage. 1113 Finally, a study completed in 2002 finds
that when a foreign firm cross-lists in the United States, the market's reac-
tion to the firm's subsequent earnings announcements increases signifi-
cantly, suggesting that information is both followed more closely and
deemed more credible.1
0 4
B. The Case for Bonding
Evidence supporting the bonding hypothesis tends to fall under four
distinct headings, each of which will briefly be examined.
1. The Market Reaction to Cross-Listings. - An initial source of evi-
dence consists of studies of the stock market's reaction to a U.S. cross-
listing by a foreign firm. Although there are numerous such studies, most
do not consider the possibility that a U.S. cross-listing serves to protect
100. Theoretical research has argued that a commitment to increased disclosure (and
thus to reduced informational asymmetries) would produce a lower cost of capital. See
generally Stanley Baiman & Robert E. Verrecchia, The Relation Among Capital Markets,
Financial Disclosure, Production Efficiency, and Insider Trading, 34 J. Acct. Res. 1, 2
(1996) (finding that "cost of capital fall[s] because more disclosure encourages investment
by individuals who may have future liquidity needs"); Diamond & Verrecchia, supra note
14, at 1325 (arguing that reducing information asymmetry by disclosing more information
can reduce cost of capital).
101. Christian Leuz & Robert Verrecchia, The Economic Consequences of Increased
Disclosure, 38J. Acct. Res. 91, 121 (Supp. 2000).
102. Lang et al., supra note 95, at 20; Baker, supra note 48, at 498 (finding 128%
increase in average number of analysts covering the firm after a cross-listing on the NYSE).
103. Id. at 22-23 (finding the firms that experience the greatest improvement in
analyst coverage also experience the greatest valuation benefits from cross-listing).
104. Warren B. Bailey et al., The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure:
Evidence from International Cross-Listings (Dice Center, Working Paper No. 2002-4, Mar.
13, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=304560 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
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and assure minority investors, and only one study has carefully focused on
the market reaction around the announcement date, rather than the
often much later date of the actual listing. The Miller Study found posi-
tive abnormal returns on the announcement of a prospective U.S. listing,
without any subsequent post-listing dissipation of those returns.
1 0 5
Alone, this is significant because proponents of the segmentation hypoth-
esis have long interpreted their theory to predict that post-listing ex-
pected returns would decline because investors would accept a reduced
rate of return with greater liquidity.10 6  More importantly, the Miller
Study also found that the stock price performance of foreign firms that
established a depository receipt facility depended heavily on whether they
also listed on an exchange or Nasdaq. Those that did not experienced
only modest positive abnormal returns, 1 7 while, in sharp contrast, those
that also listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq experienced much larger positive
abnormal returns, which were in fact more than double those of the firms
105. Miller, supra note 56, at 111. The Miller Study uses the standard econometric
techniques employed in event study methodology. Id. at 109-11. For a fuller and
accessible discussion of these techniques, see Ronald Gilson & Bernard Black, The Law
and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 185-220 (2d ed. 1995). The event under study is
the announcement of a cross-listing on a U.S. market. To calculate its impact, researchers
first measure the return on each individual stock on the day of announcement, which is
calculated in terms of the percentage price change from the prior day's trading. An
arithmetic average is then computed to yield the mean return. However, because these
returns could be influenced by aggregate movements in the broader stock market on that
day, event studies correct for this possibility by subtracting the market return for that day
from the average return for the studied stocks; the difference (whether positive or
negative) is known as the "abnormal return." The sum of the abnormal returns on all the
stocks studied is the "cumulative abnormal return" or "CAR." Id. Miller finds the
abnormal returns around the announcement date in his study to be "positive and
significant," amounting to 0.0115 (t = 3.87). Miller, supra note 56, at 111. Tests of
statistical significance (or "t-statistics") estimate the possibility that an observed abnormal
return could be the product of chance or random occurrences. If, for example, an
abnormal return is found to be statistically significant at the 5% level, this means that there
is only a 5% probability that the abnormal return was the product of chance (or, phrased
differently, there is a 95% probability that the association between the event studied and
the abnormal return was not the product of chance). On this basis, Miller's results appear
highly significant. In addition, he finds that "the increase in share value around the
announcement date appears permanent," with the post-announcement cumulative
abnormal return between the second day after the announcement and the twenty-fifth day
after the announcement being 0.0071 (t = 0.84). Id. Over the 125-day post-listing period
that he observed, the average abnormal return was 0.0030 (t = 0.16). Id. at 111-12.
106. See Foerster & Karolyi, supra note 84, at 982 (indicating post-listing "expected
returns should fall as an additional built-in risk premium compensating for these barriers
dissipates").
107. Miller, supra note 56, at 114 tbl.4, 115. The average abnormal returns around
the announcement date for foreign firms that listed on the over-the-counter or "pink
sheet" market (i.e., a Level I facility) was 0.0127 (t = 2.83), which was positive and
significant, but less than one half the average abnormal returns of firms listing on the
NYSE or Nasdaq. Id.; see infra note 108.
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that did not list.'0 8 Additionally, foreign firms that only did private place-
ments under Rule 144A in the U.S. market and then listed on PORTAL, a
special electronic market restricted to large institutional investors, had
statistically insignificant abnormal returns.10 9
Why are these differences significant? Here, it is necessary to under-
stand that a foreign firm wishing to access the U.S. capital markets by
establishing a depository receipt facility has essentially four options. First,
it can establish only a "Level I facility," which means that while a U.S.
bank, or other agent, will hold its shares and issue receipts reflecting in-
terests in them to investors, trading in these receipts will be conducted
only on the over-the-counter market (typically, in the so-called "pink
sheet" market). Second, the foreign firm can again establish a depository
receipt facility, but now the firm lists its ADR securities on an exchange or
Nasdaq. (This is called a "Level II" facility.) Third, the foreign firm can
establish the same depository facility, list its securities, and in addition
conduct an underwritten public offering of ADRs in the U.S. markets-in
effect, entering the primary market as well as the secondary market.
(This is known as a "Level III" facility,) Finally, one last alternative is to
conduct a Rule 144A private offering (which does not entail SEC registra-
tion or sales to public retail investors) and then list these securities on
PORTAL, which is a private electronic market on which only very large
institutional investors can trade (who are known as "qualified institu-
tional buyers" or "QIBs").1 1 0 This last technique is sometimes referred to
as a "RADRs" (that is, a Rule 144A offering of ADRs), and it does not
involve any entry into the public markets (either the primary or secon-
dary markets) in the United States.
Legally, there are important differences between these various levels.
Basically, firms that establish only a depository facility without listing on
an exchange or Nasdaq (a Level I facility in the standard parlance of
securities lawyers) are not required to become "reporting companies"
under U.S. federal securities laws, need not reconcile their financial state-
ments in accordance with U.S. GAAP, I I and need not file Form 20-F with
108. Miller, supra note 56, at 114 tbl.4, 115. The average abnormal returns around
the announcement date for foreign firms listing on the NYSE and Nasdaq was 0.0263 (t =
6.64). Id. This was twice the level of abnormal returns for firms listing only in the over-
the-counter market. Id.; see supra note 107.
109. The average abnormal returns around the announcement date for foreign firms
listing on PORTAL was actually negative (-0.0109) (t = -1.47), but was statistically
insignificant. Miller, supra note 56, at 114 tbl.4, 115. The difference between a NYSE or
Nasdaq listing and a PORTAL listing was 3.72% (t-statistic of difference = 6.49). Id. at 115.
110. Rule 144A exempts resales from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act of 1933 that are made by the initial purchasers of securities to QIBs, who, to qualify for
that status, generally must manage a portfolio in excess of $100 million. Private Resales of
Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2002). PORTAL is an electronic secondary
market operated by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) on which only
QIBs may trade.
111. Disagreement persists as to whether U.S. GAAP provides more or better
disclosure than international GAAP (or IAS). See Christian Leuz, LAS versus US GAAP: A
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the SEC.' 2 Rather, an exemptive SEC rule (Rule 12g3-2 (b)) permits un-
listed foreign private issuers to continue simply to file with the SEC only
the same documents that they file with their home country regulator
and/or stock exchange.' 13 In short, from a corporate governance per-
spective, little of significance happens when only a Level I facility is cre-
ated; there is no upgrading in the quality of financial disclosure and no
bonding of any consequence. In contrast, when a foreign firm lists on a
U.S. stock exchange or with Nasdaq (i.e., a Level II facility), it must be-
come a reporting company, must annually file Form 20-F with the SEC,
and must reconcile its financial statements to U.S. GAAP." 14 In addition,
it becomes subject to SEC oversight and to private enforcement in the
U.S. courts through class and derivative actions. Thus, there are mean-
ingful corporate governance changes, and the Miller Study's findings
therefore suggest that the market has responded to these changes by in-
creasing the firm's share price.' 15
Finally, when a foreign firm establishes a depository facility in the
United States, lists on a stock exchange, and makes a public offering of
securities in the United States (i.e., a Level III facility), the Miller Study
found a much stronger positive market reaction than when the firm sim-
(New) Market Based Comparison 2 (Working Paper, 2001), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractjid=257348 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (arguing that they are functionally equivalent). The issue of the differences
between IAS and U.S. GAAP dominates the current agenda of the International
Accounting Standards Committee. Yet, even if IAS and U.S. GAAP are of similar quality,
many emerging market issuers use accounting principles that do not comply with IAS, and
thus in these cases a U.S. listing necessarily implies a substantial upgrade in the quality of
the financial disclosures provided.
112. Form 20-F is the SEC form for foreign issuers corresponding to Form 10-K, which
domestic issuers must file once they become subject to section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Unlike domestic issuers, foreign private issuers need only file Form
20-F within six months after the end of their fiscal year. Basically, Form 20-F requires the
same financial information as Form 10-K, but permits the foreign issuer to file this
information in accordance with non-U.S. GAAP, if a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP is
included. See Item 17 to Form 20-F.
113. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (2002). This rule exempts a foreign issuer who
otherwise would be required to register and become a "reporting company" under section
12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 if the foreign issuer (i) is not listed on an
exchange or Nasdaq, and (ii) agrees to file with the SEC the same documents and
information it files with its home country regulators or home stock exchange or that it
otherwise distributes, or is required to distribute, to its security holders. Id. Hence, firms
listing on Nasdaq must become "reporting companies," and in the case of foreign issuers
this requires them to file Form 20-F.
114. Rule 12g3-2(b) does not apply to firms listed on Nasdaq after October 5, 1983.
Id. § 240.12g3-2(d) (3).
115. Miller, supra note 56, at 111-13, 117 (finding positive abnormal returns on
announcement of cross-listing in a U.S. market and greater returns on announcement of a
capital raising depository receipt facility-i.e., a Level III facility).
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ply listed on an exchange or Nasdaq (i.e., a Level II facility). 116 Intrigu-
ingly, this is in sharp contrast to the normal U.S. experience in which
public firms announcing a public offering of equity typically experience
an abnormal negative stock price movement.' 17 Further complicating the
picture is another finding in the Miller Study: When foreign firms sell
equity in the U.S. markets under a Rule 144A private transaction, there is
a negative price reaction, while in contrast U.S. firms increase share-
holder wealth on average by making private placements."18 The appar-
ent paradox is that while a public sale by a foreign issuer in the U.S.
market increases firm value, a private sale does not, whereas the reverse is
true in both cases for domestic issuers.
Curious as this pattern may seem, it makes sense from a corporate
governance perspective. By making a public registered sale in the United
States, a foreign issuer voluntarily subjects itself to the strict liability provi-
sions of section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.119 In principle, this gives
added credibility to what it says because it faces high liability for any mate-
rial misrepresentation or omission. In contrast, a foreign issuer that
merely lists on the NYSE or Nasdaq faces antifraud liability only under
Rule lOb-5, which requires the plaintiff to prove the defendant's fraudu-
lent intent, or scienter. 12 1 The difference between strict liability and lia-
bility only for statements made with fraudulent intent is ultimately a dif-
ference in the degree to which the firm has "bonded" itself to tell the
truth. Also, a public offering in the United States involves both the prep-
aration of a detailed registration statement that provides more current
information than the typical Form 20-FI 2 1 and the use of U.S. reputa-
116. Id. at 117. Foreign firms raising capital in a public equity offering (i.e., a Level
III facility) "experienced a positive and significant stock price reaction of 0.0323 (t =
5.67)." Id.
117. For example, one study finds that public equity offerings by U.S. firms decrease
shareholder wealth by an average of 3%. See Ronald W. Masulis & Ashok N. Korwar,
Seasoned Equity Offerings: An Empirical Investigation, 15 J. Fin. Econ. 91, 102 (1986).
The standard interpretation for this pattern is that when a seasoned firm announces an
intent to make a public offering, the market takes this announcement as a signal that the
firm does not consider its stock to be underpriced (and may consider it to be fully priced
or more). In effect, the market realizes that the firm possesses asymmetric information
about its future prospects and sees this announcement as implicitly revealing that these
future prospects will not improve in the short term.
118. See Miller, supra note 56, at 117 (finding small negative price reaction to a Rule
144A private placement by a foreign firm). In contrast, an earlier study of U.S. firms
making private placements finds that they result in an average increase in shareholder
wealth of 4%. See Karen Hopper Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm
Value: Evidence from Private Equity Financing, 23 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 8 (1989).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).
120. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002); Ernst& Ernstv. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-214
(1976) (requiring showing of scienter in Rule lOb-5 actions).
121. A foreign issuer making its first offering in the United States will typically use
Form F-1, which will require it to provide current information as of a date close to the
effective date of the registration statement. In contrast, a Form 20-F provides less historical
information and can become relatively stale because it need not be filed until six months
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tional intermediaries (i.e., underwriters and securities attorneys) who will
test the adequacy of its disclosures. Arguably, the positive market reac-
tion to a public offering by a foreign firm reflects the value of both more
information and enhanced credibility.
Ultimately, the markedly greater positive stock price reaction to for-
eign firms that conduct public offerings in the United States versus those
that simply list on the NYSE or Nasdaq corroborates the bonding hypoth-
esis, but not the market segmentation explanation. Once a foreign firm
has listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq, market segmentation has been largely
broken down, and the international capital markets have been largely in-
tegrated as to that security. Thus, if the market responds even more posi-
tively to the additional circumstance that the firm announces a public
offering, this additional share price increase cannot logically be attrib-
uted to the market segmentation explanation. Conceivably, the public
offering might be seen as a signaling device (much as stock splits are
viewed as positive signals).' 2 2 Yet no inherent reason suggests why the
announcement of a public offering in the United States would be seen as
a positive signal of still undisclosed information, particularly when the
firm has every incentive to disclose such information or to delay the offer-
ing until it can be disclosed, in order in either case to assure that the
positive information has been fully incorporated into its share price. On
balance, the simpler explanation is that the market realizes that it can
rely with greater confidence on the issuer's statements in a U.S. prospec-
tus, because (1) the issuer faces strict liability for material misstatements
or omissions; 123 (2) a powerful engine of private enforcement (e.g., the
contingent fee-motivated plaintiffs bar) stands ready to enforce U.S. le-
gal rules; and (3) more reliable gatekeepers (e.g., U.S. underwriters and
auditors) have conducted a "due diligence" investigation into the offer-
ing, motivated in part by their own high liability for negligent errors or
omissions.
Further evidence of bonding may lie in the differing market reaction
to the announcement of a foreign firm's decision to list on a U.S. ex-
change depending on the particular firm's geographic location. The
Miller Study finds that, over a three-day announcement window, foreign
firms in emerging markets experienced nearly double the cumulative ab-
after the close of the issuer's fiscal year. For example, as of May 2002, a foreign issuer's last
public filing on Form 20-F need only cover the year ending December 31, 2000, while a
domestic issuer already would have had to file its Form 10-K covering its 2001 fiscal year.
122. This suggestion has been made to me by my colleague, ProfessorJeffery Gordon.
Although I am doubtful that the announcement of a public offering signals the existence
of undisclosed, positive information, it is possible that such an offering by a foreign issuer
signals the issuer's intent to abide by a different set of corporate governance policies than
it has previously observed, including a policy of full disclosure.
123. Section 1 I of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes strict liability on the issuer for
material misstatements or omissions in a registration statement without regard to proof of
fraudulent intent or reliance by the plaintiff, and it also accords the issuer no affirmative
defense of due diligence. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
1788 [Vol. 102:1757
RACING TOWARDS THE TOP
normal returns of firms from developed markets. 124 However, the study
also found that this difference was not statistically significant. 125 Still, af-
ter further refinement of its data, the Miller Study ultimately concluded
that, on announcement of a U.S. exchange listing, firms within a subcat-
egory that it defined as the "Free Emerging" market experienced a statis-
tically significant share price gain that was nearly double that exper-
ienced over this same period by developed market firms.' 26 Although
Miller attributed this difference to the breakdown of market segmenta-
tion, it is likely that the firms within this sub-category would have been
rated as having weak corporate governance by more recent researchers.
Hence, the additional protections afforded by a U.S. listing might mean
more to their investors than to investors in more established European
firms.
Another study has also found a positive and permanent market reac-
tion for Asian firms that list in the United States. 12 7 While the magnitude
of this positive movement was modest, it did not fade away post-listing.
This was in contrast to the finding in these same studies that most non-
Asian foreign firms earn high positive abnormal returns in the year prior
to listing, but then experience high negative abnormal returns in the year
after listing.
What could explain the persistence of these gains in the case of
Asian firms? Recent empirical research on corporate governance has
identified several Asian countries as having corporate governance systems
that particularly expose minority shareholders to expropriation by con-
trolling shareholders.' 2 3 Although these findings do not apply to all
Asian countries, they could explain, at least in part, why a sample of Asian
firms cross-listing on U.S. exchanges would show a more permanent stock
market reaction, namely because, consistent with the bonding hypothesis,
124. See Miller, supra note 56, at 115. Emerging market issuers had a three-day
announcement period abnormal return of 0.0154 (t = 2.39), while developed market firms
had a similar period return of 0.0087 (t = 2.84). Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 117.
127. See Foerster & Karolyi, supra note 84, at 994 tbl.4. Although Asian firms
underperform other firms (but to a statistically insignificant extent) both in their stock
market performance during the year prior to listing and during the window period
surrounding the listing, in this study, they were almost unique in their positive post-listing
performance. Id. On average, other firms declined (and to a statistically significant
degree) during the year following U.S. listing, but Asian firms and European firms other
than those in the United Kingdom had a modest positive market reaction. Id. The
implication is apparently that stock prices of Asian firms do behave differently, possibly
because their shareholders are more exposed.
128. See Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects
of Large Shareholdings, 57J. Fin. (forthcoming Dec. 2002) [hereinafter Claessens et al.,
Entrenchment]; Michael Lemmon & Karl Lins, Ownership Structures, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence From the East Asian Financial Crisis, (William
Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 393, Apr. 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.comi/
soI3/delivery.cfm/SSRNjlD265108_codeO10411100.pdPabstractid=265108 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
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their shareholders gain more from a U.S. listing, precisely to the extent
that they were more exposed to expropriation.
All these studies are, however, dated in at least one critical respect:
They examine periods prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998.
Corporate governance theorists have plausibly proposed that the expro-
priation of minority shareholders is not a constant, steady phenomenon,
but is an episodic one that occurs primarily in periods of declining expec-
tations, particularly following major stock market retreats. 12 9 The Asian
financial crisis thus may have produced an increased rate of expropria-
tion, and, in response, portfolio investors may have become more skepti-
cal of such firms. Accordingly, Asian firms wishing to access international
equity markets thereafter would have increased incentives to bond in or-
der to overcome this skepticism.
2. The Cross-Listing Premium. - A second source of data involves a
comparison of the foreign firms that cross-list in the United States with
those that do not. A 2001 study by Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz focused not
on stock price reaction, but on the valuations of foreign firms that cross-
list in the United States in comparison to a control group that did not so
cross-list. 'I' Using the Worldscope database of firms, they find that "the
firms listed in the U.S. have a Tobin's q ratio that exceeds the q ratio of
firms from the same country that do not list in the U.S. by 16.5% on
average."'' This valuation difference, which they call the "cross-listing
premium," depends significantly on the particular form of listing chosen
and is largest for exchange-listed firms, where it reaches 37%. 132 In the
abstract, such a valuation disparity could reflect either segmentation or
bonding. Because an exchange listing increases the firm's liquidity, it is
fully consistent with the market segmentation hypothesis, but at the same
time it also supports the bonding hypothesis because it requires the issuer
to reconcile its financial statements to U.S. GAAP.
Yet, if this data does not seemingly favor one explanation over the
other, two additional factors suggest at least the special relevance of the
bonding hypothesis: First, firms "from countries with poorer accounting
standards" were found "more likely to list in the U.S.""' This makes
sense from a bonding perspective, because a U.S. listing would uniquely
signal for such companies that their accounting had been upgraded. Sec-
ond, those firms that not only cross-listed on an exchange but also raised
equity capital in connection therewith (that is, a Level III facility) had a
129. See Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58
J. Fin. Econ. 141, 142 (2000) (presenting evidence that weakness of legal mechanisms that
prevent the expropriation of minority shareholders correlated with the degree of stock
market declines in the Asian financial crisis).
130. Doidge et al., supra note 84, at 1.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 21.
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"significantly higher premium." 13 4 Again, because an exchange-listed
firm already has high liquidity, this added premium for capital raising
efforts suggests that SEC registration and the use of a U.S. underwriter
are interpreted by the market as further and persuasive evidence that the
issuer has credibly committed itself to a full disclosure policy.
3. Post-Listing Behavior: Common Law Finns Versus Civil Law Firms. -
Although the foregoing stock price studies did not consciously seek to
test the bonding hypothesis (and indeed may have been unaware of it),
one study has made a deliberate effort to test this explanation by compar-
ing firms incorporated in common law jurisdictions to those in civil law
jurisdictions. The premise of this comparison is the well-known assertion
made by LLS&V (and, more recently, by others) that the civil law pro-
vides inferior protection for minority shareholders. 135 If this is true, then
it would also logically follow that firms incorporated in civil law jurisdic-
tions would gain more from cross-listing in the United States.
To test this hypothesis, William Reese, Jr. and Michael Weisbach ex-
amined the composition and post-listing behavior of foreign firms that
cross-listed in the United States and concluded that the evidence tends to
corroborate the bonding hypothesis. Among their principal findings
were the following:
1. Firms incorporated in countries with legal systems deriving
from French civil law, which according to LLS&V provides the
weakest shareholder protections, 3 6 were the most likely to
cross-list in the United States; 
1 7
2. Such French civil law firms are also the most likely to cross-list
on securities exchanges, such as the NYSE and Nasdaq, while
firms incorporated in English common law jurisdictions are
more likely to establish only Level I facilities and remain on the
over-the-counter market;
3. Firms that cross-list in the United States significantly increase
their equity offerings following a U.S. listing. 138 This would ap-
134. Id. at 24.
135. For the original assertion of this view by LLS&V, see Rafael La Porta et al., Legal
Determinants of External Finance, 52J. Fin. 1131, 1132 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al.,
External Finance]; see also sources cited supra note 15. For a similar view taken by other
authors, see Ash Demirguc-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Law, Finance and Firm Growth, 53
J. Fin. 2107, 2108 (1998).
136. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate
Valuation, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (2000); La Porta et al., External Finance, supra note 135.
137. William A. Reese, Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder
Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66J. Fin.
Econ. 65, 66-67 (2002).
138. In their sample, Reese and Weisbach find that 111 equity offerings were effected
by firms that listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq during the two years following their U.S. listing,
but only 46 offerings were made by these same firms during the two years prior to their
cross-listing in the United States. Id. at 91. Not only did the rate thus more than double,
but the proceeds in these subsequent offerings were "about 4.2 times as high as the
proceeds from the 46 offerings in the two years prior to the cross-listing." Id.
179120021
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
pear consistent with the hypothesis that a United States listing in
some way protects minority shareholders;
4. Although the post-listing increase in equity offerings occurs
both inside and outside the United States, the substantial in-
crease in post-listing equity offerings outside the United States
that Reese and Weisbach find cannot be explained in terms of a
market segmentation hypothesis, but is consistent with a bond-
ing explanation;1 39 and
5. The weaker the shareholder protections in the foreign firm's
home jurisdiction, the greater the quantity of equity offered by
the firm after the time of its U.S. listing. 14 Finally, equity issu-
ances following cross-listings tend to be inside the United States
for "common law" firms with strong legal protections, but
outside the United States for French civil law firms. This sug-
gests that "common law" firms come to the United States to tap
its capital markets, while "civil law" firms come more for bond-
ing purposes.
The reverse side of this argument has been investigated by Pagano,
Roell, and Zechner. 41 They find that the number of U.S. companies
cross-listing in Europe shrank over the 1986 to 1997 interval (despite con-
tinued expansion by U.S. firms in Europe). Moreover, European firms
cross-listing in the United States behaved very differently from European
firms cross-listing on other European exchanges. European firms cross-
listing in the United States pursued a strategy of rapid expansion fueled
by high leverage before the listing and made large equity offerings after
the listing.1 42 They also tended to be in high-tech industries. In contrast,
European firms cross-listing in Europe.did not grow at a more rapid rate
than a control group and did not tend to make equity offerings after the
offering; rather they increased their leverage after the cross-listing.
143
Pagano et al. conclude that "the motivation for a U.S. listing appears to
be the need for an equity infusion by rapidly expanding, highly leveraged
companies that plan to expand their sales internationally and/or belong
to high-tech industries."' 44 Although this finding is consistent with the
bonding hypothesis, it suggests that those firms that enter the U.S. mar-
ket from a particular country differ distinctively from those firms in that
same country that do not enter the United States, quite apart from the
fact that those that do enter the United States may provide greater legal
protection or more credible disclosure to their shareholders. As next dis-
139. See id. at 95-101. As they explain, "firms with weak [shareholder] protection at
home will bond themselves to protect shareholders' interests all over the world by cross-
listing in the U.S. prior to issuing equity outside the U.S." Id. at 95.
140. Id. at 92. In particular, "the average new equity issue from a French civil law
country is more than three times as large as one from an English common law country."
Id.
141. See Pagano et al., supra note 21, at 7.
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cussed, this ex ante difference between listing and non-listing firms re-
quires some reinterpretation of the bonding thesis.
4. Flow Back and Market Share. - That a foreign firm lists on the
NYSE or Nasdaq does not imply that its common stock will principally
trade there (as opposed to on its home country exchange). In general,
the NYSE fraction of total global trading volume for foreign firms listed
on the NYSE ranges widely, from under 1% to more than 90%.145 In
most cases, the allocation of trading between the NYSE and the home
country exchange is constrained by an inherent limitation in the nature
of the securities traded: The NYSE will trade the issuer's ADRs, while the
home country exchange will trade the issuer's ordinary shares. This was
not the case, however, when Daimler-Benz AG merged in a share-for-
share exchange with Chrysler Corporation in 1998 to form Daimler-
Chysler AG (DCX). Rather, Daimler-Benz carefully designed a new secur-
ity-a Global Registered Share-that could trade and settle on both the
NYSE and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (and other exchanges).146
What happened? Within six months of the commencement of trad-
ing in DCX, American equity ownership had shrunk by over 50% (from
44% to 21%), and the percentage of DCX trading conducted on the
NYSE fell from 28% to 5%.147 What does this imply? A few years earlier,
Daimler-Benz had elaborately negotiated its listing on the NYSE and had
undergone the painful and costly experience of converting its earnings
from German to U.S. GAAP, which transition had turned a reported
profit (under German principles) into a loss (under U.S. GAAP). 148 In
short, Daimler management saw a U.S. listing as important to its growth
145. See Andrew Karolyi, DaimlerChrysler AG, The First Truly Global Share 15
(Working Paper, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
185133 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Pulatkonak & Sofianos, supra note
70. Pulatkonak and Sofianos find "great variability in the U.S. share of global trading,"
Pulatkonak & Sofianos, supra, at 1, but generalize that the U.S. market share is higher in
the case of emerging market stocks than in the case of stocks that have a developed home
market. Specifically, they find that where the foreign issuer has a "developed home
market," the U.S. market share is reduced by 30%. Id. at 2. Obviously, this finding can
have multiple causes, including the weaker legal protections available in many emerging
markets, but relative liquidity and trading costs is probably the simplest explanation.
146. See Karolyi, supra note 145; see also Frederick Harris et al., DCX Trading in New
York and Frankfurt: Corporate Governance Affects Trading Costs of International Dual-
Listings (Working Paper, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
147. Harris et al., supra note 146, at 1. See generally Karolyi, supra note 145. One
additional factor should be noted: Right after the merger, Standard & Poor announced
that DCX (the merged company) would be dropped from the S&P 500 index. Id. at 6.
Although this led indexed investors to sell DCX, it gave no relative advantage to the
Frankfurt market and indeed arguably only created a level playing field.
148. When Daimler-Benz agreed to reconcile its accounting to U.S. GAAP for
purposes of listing on the NYSE, its 1993 net income fell from Deutsche Marks (DM) 615
million under German GAAP to a loss of DM 1,839 million under U.S. GAAP. Dennis
Logue & James Seward, Challenges to Corporate Governance: Anatomy of a Governance




strategy, but on the merger, the shareholder class became overwhelm-
ingly German and trading moved back to Frankfurt. Such evidence sug-
gests that, although the U.S. listing was useful to Daimler, its value lay not
in breaking down market segmentation or in improving liquidity, but in
serving as a credibility-enhancing mechanism. Without a NYSE listing,
Daimler could not have made a major U.S. acquisition for stock, because
U.S. shareholders would not have been willing to accept a foreign, risky,
and illiquid security in exchange for their Chrysler shares. Even after
trading moved to Germany, DCX has maintained its NYSE listing, be-
cause it apparently creates value for the company.
This phenomenon of "flow back" supports the bonding hypothesis,
because it shows that the value of a U.S. listing may have relatively little to
do with improving liquidity or expanding the shareholder base. At the
same time, however, it also suggests that a U.S. exchange may have little
incentive to cause foreign issuers to bond in this fashion, because the U.S.
exchange does not necessarily capture the value of the trading in that
stock. That is, although the NYSE does receive a listing fee from DCX, its
dealers and specialists make little revenue from trading the stock, if 95%
of the trading occurs instead on German exchanges. As a result, the
NYSE should rationally be under-motivated to offer bonding services.
C. The Case Against Bonding
The simple bonding story also has its critics, who raise variations on
the following themes:
1. Litigation Risk. - One skeptical response has been that increased
enforcement risk associated with a U.S. listing has been exaggerated. A
detailed study by one critic argues that SEC actions against foreign firms
listed in the United States have been rare.'4' For example, between Janu-
ary 1995 andJune 2001, the SEC apparently took legal action againstjust
five foreign firms with listed ADRs. 151 Private enforcement of the securi-
ties laws against foreign firms also appears to have been limited. The
same study finds a total of only twenty-five private actions against foreign
firms between the enactment of the earliest federal securities laws in 1933
and July 31, 2001.'15
This evidence is, however, far from dispositive, either on the empiri-
cal or theoretical level. First, the SEC has recently brought high-profile
149. See Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively By Renting
U.S. Securities Laws? 15 (MIT, Working Paper No. 12797, 2001), available at http://biz.
korea.ac.kr/-aicg/paper_2nd/Can-Foreign-Firms-bond_themselvesEffectively.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding few SEC enforcement or private class actions
brought against foreign issuers listing in U.S. markets).
150. Id. at 16. The SEC did, however, initiate some fifty-four legal actions against
foreign firms over this same period, but only five of these were listed firms.
151. Id. This computation was based on a search of LEXIS records. Obviously, many
decisions are not reported by the court to LEXIS.
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enforcement actions against foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges, 1 52
and private class actions involving foreign companies listed in the United
States similarly have been filed and settled at significant cost to the for-
eign defendants.1 53 Second, as with other administrative agencies, the
SEC's litigated actions resemble the tip of the proverbial iceberg. More
enforcement occurs through informal contacts, warnings, and adminis-
trative enforcement than through litigated actions. If the SEC is suspi-
cious of a company or its disclosures, it can exercise very practical but
low-visibility sanctions, such as simply failing to clear or declare effective a
registration statement. Such warnings are likely to be particularly
respected by a foreign issuer, who is typically used to deferring to govern-
mental instructions.
On the level of theory, it is a fundamental mistake to believe that the
deterrent threat of a legal standard can be reliably inferred from evi-
dence about the actual rate of apprehension or the actual severity of sanc-
tions. Deterrence theorists have long recognized that the population to
be deterred has only limited and generally inaccurate knowledge of the
"true probabilities" of a detection. 154 More important is the manner in
which the legal threat is communicated. Here, the corporate bar in the
United States is the government's natural ally, because it maximizes its
own importance by focusing its client on the possibility of SEC enforce-
ment (and thus on the need to consult closely with U.S. counsel). Moreo-
ver, the basic message communicated by U.S. counsel-that there are le-
gal risks associated with entering the United States-is one that much of
the world already believes, as the United States is widely perceived by for-
eign firms and their officers as a litigation-crazed environment in which
152. An important and much noticed recent SEC enforcement action was In re E.ON
AG, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 43,372, 73 SEC Docket 974 (Sept. 28, 2000).
There, the SEC sued a German corporation, Veba AG, for misleading statements (made in
Germany) in which it falsely denied the existence of merger negotiations with another
German corporation, which negotiations eventually resulted in the creation of the third
largest German industrial holding company. The defendants quickly agreed to a
settlement with the SEC.
153. Two recent examples show the same fact pattern involved in the preceding
footnote being litigated by private plaintiffs in class actions: (1) Buxbaum v. Deutsche
Bank AG, 196 F. Supp. 2d 367, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying defendants' motion for
summary judgment in a class action alleging that Deutsche Bank made misleading
statements in connection with its merger with Bankers Trust); and (2) In re Alcatel
Alsthom Sec. Litig., MDL 1263 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (approving $75 million settlement paid by
Alcatel to former shareholders of DSC Communications Corp., which Alcatel acquired in a
stock-for-stock merger based on allegedly inflated financial statements). Although the
Alcatel settlement is not reported on LEXIS or Westlaw, a $75 million settlement is
substantial and will come to the attention of the extremely entrepreneurial plaintiff's bar
that privately enforces the federal securities laws in the United States.
154. See Franklin E. Zimring & GordonJ. Hawkins, Deterrence: The Legal Threat in
Crime Control 101-03, 144--45 (1973) (discussing potential lawbreakers' incomplete
information about risk of apprehension and consequent use of subjective factors in
estimating chances of apprehension).
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almost any dispute ends up in court. Overstated as this perception may
be, it is the subjective perception that counts for deterrence purposes.
Although perceptions can be debated, hard, quantitative evidence
also exists that entry into the U.S. capital markets exposes the foreign
firm to a significantly heightened risk of litigation. A 2002 study finds
that when U.K. firms access the U.S. capital markets, their auditors raise
their fees and that this fee increase reflects the difference in risk across
the two legal regimes.' 55 Further, no such increase occurs when U.K
firms access other capital markets.1 56 Because auditors in the United
States are not liable for aiding and abetting a securities law violation1
57
(with the issuer being the primary violator in such cases), it therefore
follows that the foreign firm has a greater exposure to liability than does
its auditor. Hence, if auditors charge more when their client enters the
U.S. market because of U.S, liability exposure, it logically follows that the
issuer also faces an even greater increase in its exposure to liability. Fi-
nally, because the U.K. legal system shares obvious similarities with the
U.S. system, it also seems logical that companies incorporated in civil law
countries, which lack any such similarities, would experience an even
greater relative increase in their litigation exposure on entry into the U.S.
capital market.
Accordingly, even if some foreign firms do engage in fraud after
cross-listing in the United States,15 8 most firms (and their auditors) per-
ceive themselves as exposed to significantly greater litigation risk on entry
to the U.S. capital markets. All that is necessary for the bonding hypothe-
sis to have validity is that the defendant's perceived risk of liability rises at
least marginally with its entry into the U.S. markets, not that the SEC or
private enforcers will always be omniscient or vigilant policemen. If, as a
result, the controlling persons of the foreign issuer provide superior dis-
closure or consume less private benefits of control, even if they do so only
marginally upon their firm's entry into the United States, then the value
of the public shares in such companies should logically rise (and it does).
To be sure, if the deterrent threat were greater, the price rise in the stock
of foreign firms listing in the United States might also be greater, but
both logic and the evidence support the existence of a correlation.
155. Ananth Seetharaman et al., Litigation Risk and Audit Fees: Evidence from U.K.
Firms Cross-Listed on U.S. Markets, 33 J. Acct. & Econ. 91, 93 (2002). This study
specifically rejects the possibility that this fee increase could be explained by the auditor
being required to perform more work when the U.K. firm entered the U.S. market. Id. at
101-07.
156. Id. at 93, 113.
157. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)
(holding that Rule 10b-5 does not reach aiding and abetting a securities violation).
Auditors can be used by the SEC, and by private investors under other causes of action, but
their overall liability was greatly reduced by the Central Bank decision.
158. Professor Siegel finds that there have been some notable frauds perpetrated by
foreign firms cross-listing in the United States. See Siegel, supra note 149, at 14. This
point is not disputed, but its import is unclear.
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2. The Self-Selection Problem. - A second difficulty with the simple
bonding story may require greater reformulation of this thesis. Here, the
problem is that when we compare firms that cross-list into the United
States from any given country with those firms in that sam country that
do not, we are essentially comparing apples and oranges. Even prior to
their entry into the U.S. markets, these two classes of firms were different.
The Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz study159 finds that cross-listing firms have
a higher Tobin's q,16 0 and this finding reinforces the Pagano, Roell, and
Zechner study's finding of higher leverage and recent rapid expansion by
firms cross-listing into the United States. 16 1 Together, they suggest that
firms cross-listing into the United States have higher growth prospects
(and hence a higher Tobin's q).
This apparent finding that firms cross-listing into the United States
have superior growth prospects makes obvious sense because it explains a
motivation for cross-listing: to obtain the higher valuations that those
growth prospects would command if the issuer's public statements were
deemed credible by the market. The firm with such prospects needs the
certification that entry into the U.S. market provides far more than does
the firm without such prospects. Also, such an issuer may need an equity
infusion in order to finance those growth prospects, and this will be ob-
tained with less dilution if the issuer provides its new minority sharehold-
ers with superior legal protections. Both these reasons, in turn, explain
why controlling shareholders might be willing to forego some private
benefits of control: They expect to gain more from enhanced valuations
than they lose in foregone private benefits.
Yet this interpretation implies that firms cross-listing into the United
States receive higher valuations at least partly because they have superior
growth prospects. The implicit claim by cross-listing firms of high growth
prospects is credible precisely because the controlling shareholders will
be sacrificing some measure of private benefits. Hence, the positive stock
price reaction to cross-listing in the United States is not exclusively a reac-
tion to bonding. Rather, it is a mixed response to bonding (i.e., superior
legal protections) and the implicit signal of superior earnings growth.
No simple formula seems possible by which to allocate the stock price
reaction between these two categories.
This interpretation suggests that the bonding hypothesis explains
some of the motivation to list on a U.S. exchange or Nasdaq, but that we
cannot measure with precision the actual price reaction attributable to
bonding.
3. The Market Bubble Explanation. - Finally, one last reason for skep-
ticism about bonding must be at least acknowledged. Some of the moti-
159. See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
160. Tobin's q is the ratio of a firm's market value to the replacement cost of its assets.
See Stephen A. Ross et al., Corporate Finance 37-38 (5th ed. 1999). A low Tobin's q is
generally viewed as a measure of poor management or low investor confidence in the firm.
161. See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text.
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vation to cross-list in the United States could be explained by the claim
that the equity market in the United States experienced a bubble during
the latter half of the last decade. On this premise, foreign issuers rushed
to cross-list in the United States in order to share in stock market valua-
tions not attainable elsewhere (possibly because these inflated valuations
were irrational). Although this premise could have some partial explana-
tory power, it cannot easily explain the decade-long migration of foreign
issuers to the United States. Nor has it been only high-tech firms that
have cross-listed. Finally, high stock market valuations also characterized
other markets outside the United States during this period (emerging
markets may have had even more unrealistic valuations prior to the
1997-1998 Asian financial crisis). The bubble hypothesis works only to
the extent that there is a relative disparity in valuations between the
United States and other markets that cross-listing exploits. At most then,
the bubble hypothesis should lead us to be cautious about how much of
the valuation premium inherent in cross-listing should be attributed to
the bonding effect.
A variant on this bubble hypothesis is that Enron and the related
market scandals in the United States following the collapse of the high-
tech bubble have so taken the luster off a U.S. listing and so undercut the
presumed superiority of the U.S. disclosure and governance system that
the bonding thesis will not apply prospectively (even if it was valid in the
past). Yet, significant as the U.S. scandals have been, they have been par-
alleled by similar episodes in Europe, where they have resulted in the
closing of the principal European high-tech exchange. 1 2 Moreover,
both in the United States and Europe, the response to these scandals has
been calls for heightened standards and more rigorous controls on man-
agement.1 6" Although it may prove true that the rate of cross-listings will
slow in the immediate future, the underlying cause will be economic un-
certainty that leads firms to delay public offerings and attempts to access
foreign capital markets. Over the long run, however, for firms seeking
external capital and subject to weak law in their jurisdictions of incorpo-
ration, the need to bond in some fashion is inescapable.
D. A Revised Interpretation
Under close examination, most phenomena can be unpacked, and
different subsidiary trends or forces detected. In the case of the bonding
hypothesis, it is clear that only some firms wish to bond: namely, those
with high earnings prospects and frequently high leverage. For these
firms, it is a rational tradeoff to surrender some private benefits of con-
trol for equity financing that may simply be unavailable in their own
country. Recognizing this limited and selective incentive to bond in no
162. See Mark Landler, German Technology Stock Market to be Dissolved, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 27, 2002, at WI. See also infra notes 189, 193-197 and accompanying text.
163. See infira notes 198, 277-287 and accompanying text.
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way rejects the bonding hypothesis, but it does underscore the point
made at the outset of this Article: Competition naturally produces spe-
cialization, not uniformity.
The other criticism made of the bonding hypothesis-that it exag-
gerates the litigation risk incident to entering the U.S. market-is less
telling (because subjective perceptions are what counts when measuring
deterrence). Still, it does suggest that a closer look may be needed at the
actual mechanics of bonding. When one examines the process by which
firms from emerging markets cross-list in the United States, one finds that
this transition is sometimes accompanied by significant changes in gov-
ernance, effected either by charter amendment or by contract. To cite
one recent example, Ultrapar, a large Brazilian gas and petrochemicals
firm, decided in 1999 to make a Level III entry into the U.S. market by
offering its non-voting shares through an ADR program that would list on
the NYSE. 164 Despite Ultrapar's strong financial record in Brazil, the pro-
posed offering ran into difficulty in the United States when U.S. institu-
tional investors demanded "tag along" rights that would entitle them to a
proportionate share of any control premium received by Ultrapar's con-
trolling shareholders. 1 5 As they saw it, Ultrapar was an inviting "takeover
play," but, absent changes in the firm's charter, they would be excluded
from any share of the control premium. Eventually, the transaction was
restructured so that Ultrapar amended its charter to grant such tag along
rights.16 6 Of course, there is no legal requirement that a cross-listing firm
change its governance structure, but access to equity capital may necessi-
tate changes.
In overview, such an example illustrates bonding achieved not based
on liability rules, but through actual contractual provisions. The relative
frequency of "contractual bonding," as opposed to simply "liability bond-
ing" (which occurs when the cross-listing firm simply subjects itself to U.S.
legal and disclosure requirements), remains unknown, but this example
shows the actual implementation of bonding through self-help measures.
The ability of U.S. institutional shareholders to demand such governance
changes therefore supplies an alternative, if partial, explanation for the
164. Cally Jordan & Mike Lubrano, How Effective Are Capital Markets in Exerting
Governance on Corporations?: Lessons of Recent Experience with Private and Public
Legal Rules in Emerging Markets 13 (4th Ann. Fin. Mks. & Dev. Conf., Working Paper,
2002) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
165. "Tag along" rights entitle the minority shareholders in a company to receive the
same proportionate premium over share value as the controlling shareholders receive; in
effect, they require the controlling shareholder to share any control premium. See infra
notes 223-224 and accompanying text.
166. Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 164, at 13-14. The charter amendment was
actually adopted after the public offering, but the controlling shareholders had earlier
promised to adopt the charter provision in the registration statement for the firm's initial
public offering. The institutional investors were satisfied with this promise because of the
potential U.S. securities law liability if the promoters had reneged on their promise, as
disclosures in the issuer's prospectus regarding the promised charter amendment would
have been rendered materially inaccurate.
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positive share price reaction on the announcement of a foreign firm's
decision to cross-list in the United States.
1 67
III. THE CURRENT COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE: CAN FOREIGN
MARKETS COMPETE?
Is the tide toward international (and mainly U.S.) markets irreversi-
ble? Or can foreign markets compete at protecting minority shareholder
rights? This Part will survey the institutional and legal developments that
will shape and constrain the emerging competition among securities
markets.
A. The Trend Towards Demutualization
Historically, securities exchanges in the U.S. and generally elsewhere
have operated as non-profit mutual or membership organizations. As
such, they behaved more like sluggish monopolies than dynamic entre-
preneurs. That pattern is, however, rapidly changing. The first exchange
to demutualize was the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1993; it was quickly
followed by the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1995, the Copenhagen Stock
Exchange in 1996, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the Borsa Italiana
in 1997, and the Australian Stock Exchange in 1998.168 In 2001, each of
the London Stock Exchange, the Deutsche Boerse, and Euronext N.V.
(itself the union of the Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam stock exchanges)
completed its initial public offering, and the Italian Bourse has an-
nounced similar plans.1
6 9
Within the United States, Nasdaq has been partially privatized, with
its former parent, the NASD, now owning only a minority equity interest
in it, but still holding majority voting control until the SEC acts on its
pending application to convert to the formal status of a stock exchange
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 171 A Nasdaq initial public
offering appears likely in the near future. The NYSE alone has not
changed. Although it has publicly discussed the possibility of demutual-
ization, it has backed off from this proposal at least for the present, ap-
parently because of internal tensions.
What will demutualization imply for competition and consolidation?
When organized as a membership or mutual organization, the govern-
ance of American stock exchanges generally gave the specialists and cer-
tain market-making members control of the price, quality, and range of
167. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
168. For a brief overview of this trend, see Karmel, supra note 98, at 348-49.
169. See Nicola Hobday, LSE Shares Dip on Market Debut, Daily Deal, July 20, 2001,
available at http://www.thedeal.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=theDeal/
TDDArticle/TDStandardArticle&c=TDDAticle&cid=1003865130171 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
170. To function as an exchange, an applicant must register as a "national securities
exchange" under section 5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and have its application
approved by the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78e (2000).
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services offered by the exchange. 171 With demutualization comes a more
simplified governance structure in which the interests of the new share-
holders are likely to dominate over those of the constituent groups within
the exchange who formerly exercised veto power. Shareholders in turn
will predictably wish to maximize the share value of their investment, and
so will look favorably both upon acquisition and merger proposals and
innovation generally. This does not mean that takeover proposals will
necessarily be accepted (managements of private corporations in the
United States and elsewhere have a long history of blocking them), but
the rate of merger and acquisition activity seems likely to grow and, inde-
pendently, the profitability of the exchange will become the dominant
consideration.
B. The Shaky Status of Exchanges in Transitional Economies
Of the twenty-six transition economies, stock markets have emerged
or been created in twenty of them, beginning with the Prague Stock Ex-
change in 1992.172 Typically, the new exchange in these transitional
economies simply listed the shares of all mass-privatized companies. This
was the Czech model, but it produced disastrous results for the credibility
of these new exchanges. Mass listing of all privatized companies pro-
duced a very large number of listings, but relatively thin trading in most
of these stocks. Illiquidity in turn invited market manipulation, and a
series of scandals accompanied the early history of exchanges that fol-
lowed this approach. Ownership of these firms quickly concentrated,
leaving only a small minority float in the public market.
In contrast, in a few transitional markets (most notably, Hungary and
Poland), a different approach to privatization was followed, and fewer
companies were listed.'17 3 In these markets, the principal route to listing
was through an initial public offering conducted through the exchange.
While fewer stocks were listed, they enjoyed more liquid trading.
Not surprisingly, the number of listed companies on those ex-
changes that listed virtually all mass-privatized companies has subse-
quently shrunk. Nor have most of these exchanges been able to provide
equity financing. The Prague Stock Exchange still has not seen a single
initial public offering.' 74 This inability to provide equity financing can
partly be ascribed to regulatory failures and a resulting lack of investor
confidence in many transitional economies. But this is not the total ex-
171. This is the conclusion reached by Professor Karmel, a former SEC
Commissioner. See Karmel, supra note 98, at 347-48.
172. See Claessens et al., Stock Markets, supra note 39, at 1.
173. For a more detailed review of the Czech and Polish approaches, see John C.
Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market
Failure, 25J. Corp. L. 1, 9-23 (1999).
174. See Rick Jervis, Stock Exchanges in Central and Eastern Europe Are Shrinking
Due in Part to Slow Privatization, Wall St.J.,July 16, 2001, at C16 (noting postponement of
first scheduled Czech IPO).
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planation. In many Central and Eastern European countries, large firms
could obtain bank credit through political lobbying.' 75 The cost of eq-
uity was high in comparison to lower-cost debt from often state-controlled
banks, and hence newly privatized firms relied on debt financing and dis-
dained equity financing (in part also because equity issuances would di-
lute the controlling stakes of those running the privatized firm).
As a result, of the twenty stock markets in transition countries, only
four-Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland-have market
capitalization-to-GDP ratios in excess of 20% (which is a standard bench-
mark that many emerging market countries have surpassed).1 7 6 The av-
erage capitalization-to-GDP ratio in transition economies is only 11%.177
Market turnover (defined as the value of trading over market capitaliza-
tion) is similarly low, with Hungary (93%), the Czech Republic (81%),
and Poland (69%) standing apart and comparing favorably with Latin
American countries.' 7 8 The average turnover ratio in the transitional
economies is only 30%. 
17 9
Transitional stock markets are also typically dominated by a few, dis-
proportionately large firms. The top 5% of listed companies account on
average for 75% of all turnover. (Poland is a dramatic exception to this
pattern, with the top 5% accounting for only 40% of all turnover.) In-
deed, in a number of transitional markets, five or fewer firms account for
95% or more of the total market turnover. 18() Hence, if these major firms
cross-list on an international exchange and trading in their stocks predict-
ably follows, the home country exchange will predictably suffer a major
loss of liquidity and will experience higher trading costs with regard to its
remaining stocks (because the exchange's largely fixed overhead will now
have to be charged against this reduced level of trading).
Consistent with the pattern of dual listings discussed earlier, larger
public companies in transitional economies have listed in the United
States or on the LSE. At the end of 1999, some seventy-two companies
from transitional economies had listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq, and sixty-
one such companies had listed in London.181 Trading has similarly mi-
grated abroad, with "the number of shares traded abroad [being] twice as
high as the number of shares traded locally." 182 As local trading dries up,
smaller public firms in transitional economies, which would not qualify
175. See Claessens et al., Stock Markets, supra note 39, at 2.
176. Id. at 4 fig.2.
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id. Market turnover in Latin America averages around 50%. Id. Several
transitional markets in Central Asia have turnover ratios under 5% and are effectively
illiquid. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. This is true even in the case of some large countries, such as the Ukraine. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 3, 7.
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for a NYSE listing, have also begun listing on German exchanges, most
commonly the Frankfurt.
18 3
The prospects for many transitional stock markets are not encourag-
ing. A World Bank study, released in September 2000, predicts that even
by the year 2005 and "[u] nder the best possible policy outcomes," only six
of the twenty-six transitional economies will have securities markets with
market capitalizations equal to 25% or more of GDP-a level that is more
or less the median for other emerging markets today.' 8 4 Market turnover
is also predicted to remain low in most transitional economies, with only
a minority approaching the 50% level needed to assure liquidity. 18 5 Low
liquidity then seems an endemic problem for these exchanges.
To achieve economies of scale sufficient to produce decreasing costs
in the processing of trades, some estimate that a securities market needs
to have a market capitalization in excess of $15 billion.' 86 On this basis,
only four transitional economies are likely to reach this point by 2005:
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia. v87 This analysis sug-
gests that trading costs will remain comparatively high on most smaller
markets, further inhibiting their ability to compete on an international
level. In turn, this may motivate issuers on these markets to seek other
trading venues, even if they are not interested in improving their corpo-
rate governance.
This bleak picture does not establish that smaller markets will neces-
sarily fail. For political reasons, including nationalistic pride, some may
be subsidized, much as national flag airlines have been. Still, as these
markets stagnate, the firms listed on them will need to cross-list elsewhere
if they are to raise equity or maintain liquidity. Hence, the combined
impact of demutualization and poor economic prospects suggest that
many smaller markets will seek alliances, including mergers. Although
mergers have been admittedly rare to this point, a precedent has been set
by the three Baltic exchanges (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), which
have merged and also established a linkage with the Helsinki Stock Ex-
change.' 8 8 All in all, it is difficult to describe a future for securities ex-
changes in transitional economies that does not involve radical consolida-
tion. Even regional exchanges may find it hard to survive unless they
either (1) obtain subsidies from the state, or (2) establish a "brand name"
that attracts listings.
183. See Jervis, supra note 174 (discussing failing stock markets of Central and
Eastern Europe).
184. See Claessens et al., Stock Markets, supra note 39, at 16.
185. See id. (predicting that, even under ideal circumstances, only the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Slovak
Republic, and Slovenia would achieve this level).





C. A Success Story?: The Experience of New "High Standards" Markets
The foregoing bleak description of the stock markets in transitional
economies suggests that the odds are stacked formidably high against any
new entrant. But two counterexamples need to be considered before a
serious evaluation is possible. In both Germany and Brazil, new "high
standards" markets have been recently established by existing exchanges
in an effort to halt the migration of listings and trading to the United
States.
1. The Neuer Markt. - Established in 1997 by its parent, the
Deutsche Borse, the Neuer Markt swiftly became Europe's dominant mar-
ket for high growth firms, both in terms of number of listings and market
capitalization.' 8 9 Indeed, in so doing, it outdistanced earlier established
rivals (such as Easdaq, which eventually was acquired by Nasdaq), and
successfully resisted Nasdaq's own efforts to achieve dominance in the
European market.
Intended as a market for high growth firms, the Neuer Markt
adopted a unique style by advertising itself as the "most regulated market"
in Europe. 9° Whenever possible, it regularly stressed its high disclosure
and transparency standards, which it continued to upgrade. Listing eligi-
bility on the Neuer Markt required that an issuer: (1) adopt either IAS or
U.S. GAAP; (2) publish quarterly financial reports within two months af-
ter each quarter; (3) hold at least one analyst conference per year; (4)
prepare and publish audited annual financial statements no later than
three months after the end of its fiscal year; (5) have a minimum free
float of 20%; (6) adhere to a six month lock-up period following its initial
public offering before insiders can sell their shares; and (7) disclose all
share transactions by managers, the company, and supervisory board
members. 19 1 In addition, the contents of the required IPO prospectus
were also elaborately specified.
192
In substance, these requirements were more rigorous than those
specified either by its parent, the Deutsche Boerse, or, more surprisingly,
by the SEC, which permits foreign issuers to file only its Form 20-F. In
comparison to the Neuer Markt's quarterly reporting and tight deadlines,
Form 20-F does not require quarterly reporting and permits the issuer to
delay until six months after its fiscal year before filing its annual audited
financial report. Initially, the Neuer Markt's strategy worked: It quickly
grew from only two listed companies in 1997 to 302 in 2000 and acquired
a market capitalization of $172 billion in only three years. 193 Only a
handful of exchanges had larger capitalizations.
189. See Leuz, supra note 111, at 8-9 (crediting Neuer Markt's success to strict
disclosure and listing requirements).
190. Vanessa Fuhrmans, Playing by the Rules: How Neuer Markt Gets Respect, Wall
St. J., Aug. 21, 2000, at C1.
191. See Lez, sIpra note 111, at 8-9.
192. Id. at 8.
193. Fuhrmans, supra note 190.
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More recently, however, the Neuer Markt became plagued by scan-
dals and saw its market capitalization slide by 73% since the end of
1999.194 All this is not surprising for an exchange populated with low
priced, high risk stocks. In response, the Neuer Markt tightened its rules,
required more disclosure, and adopted standards that delisted a number
of firms.' 95 Even more interestingly, it did so at the request of its larger,
more established issuers, which pressured the Neuer Markt to purge its
more questionable listed firms.1
96
Nonetheless, despite strong efforts at reform, the Neuer Markt's rep-
utation had become sufficiently tarnished that the Deutsche Borse, its
parent, announced in late 2002 its intent to shut down the Neuer Markt
by the end of 2003.197 Yet, even if the Neuer Markt thus failed, its idea of
heightened listing standards survives. In its place, the Deutsche Borse will
create a new market category-known as the "Prime Standard"-which
will impose "much more stringent standards of corporate disclosure than
were required by the Neuer Markt."'198
Ultimately, the fate of Neuer Markt shows less the failure of height-
ened disclosure standards than the strength of the network externalities
that link firms traded on the same high profile market. Once some firms
on the Neuer Markt became mired in scandals, the Neuer Markt's reputa-
tion became tarnished. Stronger firms first tried to upgrade standards,
but ultimately began to flee, causing the Deutsche Borse to close down its
experiment because its name had become synonymous with scandal.
The Neuer Markt's problems also underscore the inevitable limits of
self-regulation. Observers report that many of the scandals plaguing the
Neuer Markt were the product of a shortfall in deterrence attributable to
the lack of enforcement of insider trading restrictions in Germany. 199 In
this light, there may be outer limits on the ability of bonding to work,
194. Jack Ewing et al., The Neuer Markt: Can It Hang On?, Bus. Wk. (Int'l Ed.),July
30, 2001, at *18, available at 2001 WL 2208284 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see
also Alfred Kueppers, A Busy Bidder in Germany Highlights Flaws in Neuer Markt's Efforts
to Challenge Nasdaq, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 2001, at ClI [hereinafter Kueppers, Busy Bidder]
(providing illustrations of how "speculators and market manipulators" exploited Neuer
Markt's weaknesses); Alfred Kueppers, Deutsche Boerse Sets Up New Rules for Neuer
Markt, Wall St. J.,July 19, 2001, at Al9 [hereinafter Kueppers, New Rules] (noting that "a
series of scandals and insolvencies tarnished the four-year-old growth exchange").
195. Kueppers, New Rules, supra note 194; see also Alfred Kueppers, Deutsche Boerse
Sets Delisting Terms for Penny Stocks, Wall St. J., July 23, 2001, at A]2 (adopting "one
euro" standard as minimum trading price for purposes of delisting).
196. Neal E. Boudette & Alfred Kueppers, Frustrated Neuer Markt Members Push for
Tightening Listing Rules, Wall St. J., July 11, 2001, at C12.
197. Silvia Ascarelli & G. Thomas Sims, German Exchange Unplugs Neuer Markt,
Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 2002, at A12; Mark Landler, German Technology Stock Market to be
Dissolved, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 2002, at Wi.
198. Landler, supra note 197. In particular, quarterly financial reporting and
compliance with international accounting standards will remain mandatory.
199. Kueppers, Busy Bidder, supra note 194.
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which are set by the strength of the legal protections in thejurisdiction of
listing.
2. The Novo Mercado. - If the Neuer Markt was the product of Eu-
rope's desire to emulate Nasdaq and create an indigenous nursery in
which to grow young high-tech companies, Brazil's Novo Mercado was
the product of the massive migration of local firms to the United States
and the consequent decline in liquidity in Latin American markets.
200
The Sdo Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa), Brazil's largest exchange, was
adversely affected by these developments and perceived the weakness in
Brazil's protection of minority shareholders to be a principal factor inhib-
iting the development of its securities market.
20 '
Frustrated in attempts to secure legislative reform,2 0 2 Bovespa in-
stead decided to follow the example of the Neuer Markt. Indeed, it in-
vited U.S. institutional investors to participate in the design of the listing
rules for this new exchange in order to assure that they would be "inves-
tor friendly. ' 20 3 Basically, its goal was less to create a specialized incuba-
tor for high-tech companies (of which Brazil had relatively few) than a
"high corporate governance" listing section that would be open only to
issuers that voluntarily elected to subscribe to its stricter rules. To maxi-
mize its attractiveness to new issuers, Bovespa created three special listing
segments of its exchange, in addition to its traditional exchange (whose
listing requirements were not changed): Special Corporate Governance
Level 1, Special Corporate Governance Level 2, and the Novo
Mercado.
2114
This creation of three enhanced listing options in addition to a stan-
dard listing on the Bovespa was essentially a concession to the desire of
listed firms to adopt some reforms, but not all. Level 1 issuers simply
agreed to higher disclosure and transparency standards, but did not re-
vise their corporate governance standards. Level 2 issuers and those who
list on the Novo Mercado obligated themselves to settle shareholder dis-
putes using a "Market Arbitration Panel," which represents a new legal
remedy in Brazil.2° 5 Functionally, this arbitration remedy appears to
have been intended as a substitute for class actions and derivative actions,
which could not have been easily established without legislation (and,
even then, might have been difficult to graft onto Brazil's highly tradi-
200. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. The daily trading volume on the
Sio Paulo Stock Exchange fell from $1 billion to less than $150 million (or over 85%)
during this period. Colitt, Capital Markets, supra note 62.
201. See Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 164, at 21.
202. Legislative reform was later enacted in Brazil. See infra notes 215-222 and
accompanying text.
203. Craig Karmin &Jonathan Karp, Brazilian Market Tries Friendly Approach: Novo
Mercado's Rules Aim to Help Minority Holders, Wall St. J., May 10, 2001, at CI.
204. See Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 164, at 22.
205. Id. (noting that "[in] anticipation of the Novo Mercado," Brazil strengthened
the legal standing of voluntary arbitration, making the enforcement of arbitral awards
easier).
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tional and civil law-oriented judicial system). To list on the Novo Mer-
cado, however, the issuer had to accept major corporate governance re-
forms and obligate itself to (1) not issue non-voting shares and comply
with a "one-share, one-vote" rule; (2) maintain a free float equivalent to
25% of the outstanding stock; (3) grant "tag along" rights under which all
non-controlling shareholders would be accorded the same right to sell
their shares and on the same terms (including price) as were to be given
the controlling shareholder; and (4) elect all directors at each annual
meeting. Additionally, the issuer agreed to observe heightened disclo-
sure standards, including quarterly reporting and the use of U.S. GAAP
or IAS accounting standards. On the practical level, the leading differ-
ences between Level 2 and the Novo Mercado were that an issuer who
listed only on the former could still utilize non-voting shares and its con-
trolling shareholders would not be required to share control premiums.
Similarly, a Novo Mercado listing differed from a NYSE listing in that it
required substantive governance reform in addition to enhanced
disclosure.
20 6
So what happened? The Novo Mercado's listing rules were officially
announced in December 2000, but it was not until February 2002 that the
first (and still the only) company listed on it.2° 7 As of April 2002, some
nineteen companies had listed on Level 1 (which does not require any
revisions in substantive corporate governance), but none had listed on
Level 2 (although a few companies have announced their intention to do
so after obtaining shareholder approval of the requisite corporate gov-
ernance changes).
208
What does this weak (or at least equivocal) response suggest about
the desire to bond? At a minimum, it implies that a new exchange or
listing segment will face difficulty in competing with the stronger "reputa-
tional brand" of the NYSE. Firms that list on the NYSE also obtain the
practical ability to effect an initial public offering, while the feasibility of
such an offering remains doubtful in Brazil. Such "high standards" ex-
changes may therefore appeal only to firms that do not qualify for a NYSE
listing or that find the expenses associated with cross-listing to be prohibi-
tive. Yet, it is noteworthy (and perhaps ironic) that the Novo Mercado
essentially leapfrogged the NYSE by precluding the use of non-voting
206. See id. at 20-22 & n.49.
207. Id. at 23. The first firm to list on the Novo Mercado was Companhia de
Concessoes Rodoviarias (CCR), a highway concession manager. Because CCR is in the
business of buying highway concessions from many of its founders-firms that dominated
the Brazilian highway construction industry-strong corporate governance was perceived
as a necessity from the start and special provisions were inserted in its charter concerning
the approval of self-dealing transactions. Id. at 14.
208. Id. at 23. Jordan and Lubrano point out that while these results may be
disappointing, they can be explained to a significant degree by uncertainty in the Brazilian
economy following the economic crisis in Argentina and a domestic energy crisis. Against
this backdrop, few firms have been willing to undertake a public offering or make other
long-term economic commitments. Id. at 23 n.52.
2002] 1807
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
shares (while the NYSE continues to list foreign firms with non-voting
classes of stock). Taken together, the relative success of the Neuer Markt
and the relative failure (at least to date) of the Novo Mercado may show
that there is a market for "high disclosure," but that emerging market
firms are less willing to opt into substantive governance reform. In turn,
this may reflect that the logical alternative to a local listing is a NYSE
listing, which does not require foreign issuers to subscribe to the NYSE's
own governance rules.
D. The "New" Regulatory Competition: The Latin American Evidence
The Novo Mercado was essentially a response by Bovespa to Brazil's
inability to enact meaningful corporate governance reform legislation.
20 9
Yet, since 2000, the major Latin American markets-Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, and Mexico-have enacted significant corporate governance re-
form legislation, after decades of inaction.2 10 At least one precipitating
cause of this new legislation appears to have been the loss of liquidity in
Latin American markets as a result of listing migration to the NYSE. This
section will briefly review the Brazilian and Mexican experiences.
1. Brazil. - Brazilian companies typically issue much more pre-
ferred stock than common stock, frequently approaching the 2:1 ceiling
that Brazilian corporate law places on the ratio of preferred stock to com-
mon stock.2 1 1 Because the preferred stock carries no voting rights, this
tactic permits a controlling shareholder to hold control with as little as
17% ownership of the company's stock.2 12 Typically, a minority of the
voting shares (which are known in Brazil as "ON" shares, while the non-
voting preferred shares are known as "PN" shares) will be held by public
investors and will trade at an even greater discount than the non-voting
preferred because the ON shares' voting rights are meaningless and, un-
like the preferred, they carry no special dividend rights. The discount on
both ON and PN shares is steep because the controlling shareholders (1)
can and do monopolize the control premium if an acquirer wishes to buy
their company, and (2) often deliberately understate earnings, or sus-
pend the company's communications with the market, in order to drive
down the market price before they tender for the stock, themselves. 2 13 A
1998 tender offer by an American acquirer for a Brazilian retailer created
a political furor when it offered no premium to any shareholders other
than those in the controlling group.
2 14
209. Brazil did enact corporate governance reform legislation in November 2001, well
after the creation of the Novo Mercado. Id. at 10 & n.25.
210. See id.; see also sources cited supra notes 124-137.
211. See Barham, supra note 24, at 41.
212. Id. That is, if only one-third of the company's equity is represented by voting
shares, then 17% will constitute a majority of this one-third.
213. See id. (reporting that large writedowns might be taken "for labor,
environmental or tax charges" in order deliberately to reduce earnings).
214. Id. at 42. The American acquirer was J.C. Penney & Co.
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As a result of both a series of scandals and the recognition that Bra-
zil's capital market was shrinking,2 15 a four-year political struggle cli-
maxed in 2001 with the passage of compromise corporate governance
legislation that contained the following principal elements:
a. Restrictions on Non-Voting Stock. - Future Brazilian companies will
be permitted to issue non-voting preferred stock only up to 50% of their
capitalization. 2 16 The long-term effect thus will be to raise the minimum
ownership level necessary to hold absolute voting control to 25%.
b. Tag Along Rights. - In its most fundamental compromise, the
new law confers a right on common shareholders to receive 80% of the
premium paid to controlling shareholders in a takeover; however, this
right was not extended to preferred shareholders.
21 7
c. Board Representation. - Preferred shareholders holding more than
10% of the non-voting shares receive the right to appoint a director, and
shareholders holding more than 15% of the voting shares receive a simi-
lar right. However, this right was counterbalanced by granting the con-
trolling shareholders the right to appoint the same number of board
members as minority shareholders, plus one, thereby ensuring that the
new voting rules would not cause control to shift.218
d. Right to Call a Shareholder Meeting. - Shareholders with 10% or
more of a company's equity, or 5% of its voting power, received the right
to call a general meeting of the shareholders if they believe that there is a
conflict between their interests and those of the controlling shareholders.
At this meeting, absent shares may, under some conditions, be voted
against the management, 219 and, under at least some circumstances, the
meeting may appoint an arbitrator to resolve differences.
220
e. Minimum Liquidity and Buybacks. - When regulators determine
that controlling shareholders have reduced the company's liquidity, they
can require a tender by them for the remaining shares at a minimum
price specified by the regulators. 221 In addition, company buybacks must
be approved by at least half of all shareholders in the affected class or
classes.
2 2 2
The impact of these changes remains uncertain, particularly in light
of high interest rates, political uncertainty, and deteriorating
215. During the first half of 2001, over a third of the trading in Brazilian shares
occurred on the NYSE. See Colitt, Reform, supra note 61, at 46; see also supra notes 59-63
and accompanying text.
216. See Barham, supra note 24, at 42. Existing Brazilian companies were, however,




220. See Colitt, Capital Markets, supra note 62.




macroeconomic conditions. 223 Controlling shareholders were able to
thwart the original reform campaign to extend "tag along" rights to non-
voting shareholders, but were defeated in turn in their opposition to
board representation for non-voting shareholders. To the extent that
there has been even piecemeal reform, it appears to have been signifi-
cantly motivated by the fear of the Brazilian securities industry that, with-
out change, the industry would decline.
224
2. Mexico. - The recent Mexican experience differs from that of
Brazil primarily in that the campaign to extend "tag along" rights to non-
voting shares was more successful. As noted earlier, Mexico experienced
a migration of listings and trading volume to the NYSE that was at least as
significant as that experienced by Brazil.2 25 In response, in April 2002,
pursuant to earlier enacted legislation delegating the requisite power to
them, Mexico's National Commission on Banking and Securities, in com-
bination with the Mexican Stock Exchange and the Mexican Association
of Market Intermediaries, substantially revised its rules on tender offers in
order to strengthen the rights of minority shareholders and accord them
a proportionate share of control premia.2 26 Under this reform, non-vot-
ing shares now enjoy full "tag along" rights in the event of takeover offers.
Specifically, the new rules preclude partial bids for just the controlling
shares by requiring that if the bidder seeks to purchase between 30% and
50% of the voting stock, it must tender for all share classes on a similar
basis and at the same price; further, any offer for more than 50% of the
voting stock obligates the bidder to tender for 100% of all shares in all
classes. 227 While the rules do not prohibit non-voting shares, they were
intended to create an incentive to cause issuers to abandon their existing
structure of multiple share classes, and some issuers have already re-
sponded by doing so. 2 28 In turn, the goal of this effort was to make "local
and foreign investors feel more secure about investing in Mexican
equities."
22 9
The irony in the Mexican experience is that, while the benefits of
improved corporate governance will be principally felt by Mexican firms
223. Some anectodal evidence exists that the former discount between ON and PN
shares has begun to shrink in light of these reforms. See id. at 43 (discussing Petrobras,
the Brazilian national oil company and largest publicly held company).
224. For evidence that decisionmakers think in these terms, see Smith, supra note 25,
which describes the chairman's efforts to revitalize Bovespa and analysts' and industry
participants' belief that those efforts help reverse decline. Also, the closing of thirteen
brokerage firms in Saio Paulo during 2001 would obviously have added to this sense of
impending market collapse. See id.
225. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
226. John Authers, Mexico Moves to End Share Class Warfare: New Rules on Tender
Offers Will Boost the Voting Rights of Minority Stockholders, Fin. Times (N. Am. ed.), May
2, 2002, at 24.
227. Id.
228. Grupo Elektra, Mexico's largest electronics retailer, announced in April 2002
that it would convert its non-voting shares into a single voting structure. Id.
229. Id. (quoting Renato Grandmont, Deutsche Bank Securities, New York).
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(which in theory should be able to raise more equity at lower cost with
improved governance), the impetus for these reforms has come not from
Mexican corporations (which could have adopted them voluntarily), but
from the Mexican securities industry (which was the principal loser from
cross-listings). The indifference or even hostility of Mexican firms to cor-
porate governance reform is understandable, because improved govern-
ance implies reduced private benefits of control, and controlling share-
holders may anticipate that these lost benefits will exceed the value to
them of any improvement in their firm's stock price. Nonetheless, politi-
cal reforms, even if piecemeal, may have come for the unexpected reason
that the controlling shareholders' desire to retain the private benefits of
control conflicts with the ability of the local securities market to survive in
a globalizing world.
IV. How MARKETS WILL COMPETE: RIVAL SCENARIOS
To this point, it has been argued that the world of securities markets
is in flux: Exchanges are privatizing; issuers are cross-listing; some mar-
kets may fail; and others may consolidate by any of several techniques.
Finally, the latest development is that some legislatures are responding to
the loss of trading to international exchanges by enacting reform legisla-
tion. But will this new competition produce a race to the top or to the
bottom? As next examined, a plausible case can be made for either
scenario.
A. The "Race to the Top" Scenario
The case for governance reform as a strategy to increase the competi-
tiveness of a market center is becoming increasingly easy to make. Al-
though comparative studies of corporate governance in the United States
have not been able to correlate "higher" standards of governance with
improved market value, the reverse has been true in the case of emerging
markets. Several studies have shown that firms with higher quality gov-
ernance have higher market values. 230 Similarly, the cost of capital ap-
pears to be lower for firms that make fuller disclosure. In the most com-
230. See, e.g., Bernard Black, Does Corporate Governance Matter?: A Crude Test
Using Russian Data, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2131, 2132-33 (2001) (using data sample of sixteen
large Russian public companies and finding results suggesting that governance strongly
impacts market value); Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm
Attributes, Legal Environment, and Firm Valuation (Univ. of Mich. Bus. Sch., Working
Paper, 2002), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/research/mitsui/symp02docs/steal-
notsteal.doc (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (using data sample of 859 firms from
27 countries and finding firms with higher corporate governance rankings are valued
higher); Leora F. Klapper & Inessa Love, Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and
Performance in Emerging Markets 21-22 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper
No. 2818, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN-ID303979_
code020319500.pdfabstractid=303979 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (using data
sample of 374 firms from 14 emerging markets and finding correlation between strong
governance and higher market value).
18112002]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
plete of these studies, Durnev and Kim survey 859 firms in 27 countries
and find not only a positive relationship between firm valuation and cor-
porate governance, but that the relationship is strongest in countries hav-
ing the weakest protection of minority shareholders. 231 The apparent im-
plication for emerging market companies based on such studies is that
they can reduce their costs of capital by taking private action that im-
proves their corporate governance. Specifically, they found that "a 10-
point increase (out of 100) in CLSA corporate governance scores in-
creases a firm's market value by 13.3%, while a 10-point increase (out of
98) in S&P transparency scores increases a firm's market value by
16.3%."232 In short, even under weak legal regimes, private action can
apparently work to assure investors and thereby maximize share value.
Such data is entirely consistent with this Article's thesis because bonding
is essentially a form of private action. Whether through cross-listing or
charter amendments, firms desiring external finance have an incentive
voluntarily to undertake actions that assure minority investors that they
will be fairly treated. This incentive actually grows stronger the weaker
the legal regime under which the firm is incorporated.
Durnev and Kim's finding that increased transparency also translates
into increased market value reinforces the work of other finance theo-
rists, who have argued that traders, in addition to issuers, will also prefer
"high disclosure" exchanges. Huddart, Hughes, and Brunnermeier claim
that liquidity traders will opt to trade on "high disclosure" exchanges and
that informed traders (i.e., those possessing material non-public informa-
tion) will follow them in order to "exploit the disguise afforded by the
greater depth on that exchange."
2 33-
The "race to the top" scenario must face, however, two important
objections. First, exchanges may not benefit by establishing themselves as
high quality, "high disclosure" exchanges if the trading in the foreign
issuers that list on these exchanges still flows back to the issuer's home
country exchange. Such flow back is common, as shown by the Daimler-
Chrysler experience, 23 4 and it may accelerate as firms come to replace
ADRs with global shares that can settle in either country. 23 5 If a foreign
issuer can list on the NYSE, and yet the majority of the trading in its stock
eventually flows back to the issuer's home country exchange, the NYSE
gains less from such a listing than from a comparable domestic listing.
2 36
231. Durnev & Kim, supra note 230, at 2, 33.
232. Id. at 34. The CLSA governance score used by Durnev and Kim was developed by
Credit Lyonnais, which has performed a similar study on a smaller data set reaching closely
similar conclusions.
233. Huddart et al., supra note 9, at 238. This theory may too easily assume that
insider trading can still be conducted on "high disclosure" exchanges.
234. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
235. For discussions of the advantages of the new global share, see Gruson, supra note
43, at 196-98; Karolyi, supra note 145, at 7-16, 26.
236. The NYSE's core participants-brokers and specialists-profit to the extent that
a stock is traded on the NYSE. To be sure, the NYSE gains a listing fee, but these are likely
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This may explain why the NYSE has long been more willing to waive list-
ing requirements that it applies to domestic issuers for foreign issuers.
2.3 7
Because both it and its dealers gain less from such a listing and because
the NYSE must compete with a foreign exchange for trading volume, the
NYSE logically has less incentive to pursue a bonding policy that benefits
it only marginally.
Second, the increase in stock value associated with listing on a "high
disclosure" exchange may mean little to controlling shareholders, who
are more focused on retaining the private benefits of control, as next
discussed.
B. The "Race to the Bottom" Scenario
The alternative perspective begins with the recognition that firms
with controlling shareholders may not wish to upgrade their disclosure or
governance practices because controlling shareholders enjoy (and do not
wish to reduce) high private benefits of control. For controlling share-
holders, what is particularly important is the ability to receive a control
premium that is based on their participation in the firm's voting rights,
rather than on their typically lower participation in the firm's cash
flow. 238 On any given exchange outside the United States and the United
Kingdom, firms with controlling shareholders are likely to be in the ma-
jority and hence able to outvote those firms that wish to upgrade the local
exchange's governance or disclosure requirements-if these reforms
seem likely to challenge their ability to receive the traditional private ben-
efits of control. Even a privatized exchange would be unlikely to seek to
raise its governance standards for listed companies if this effort were
likely to cause the delisting of a significant number of listed companies.
Hence, a powerful coalition of entrenched forces appears ready to resist
governance reform in most markets.
Dealers also may have little innate desire to upgrade transparency or
disclosure standards. One recent study notes several examples in which
non-transparent exchanges seem to have dominated transparent ones.
2 39
In particular, the LSE was able to outcompete the Paris Bourse for large
block traders by permitting dealers to delay the reporting of such block
transactions for several days.24 0 So much of the block trade volume mi-
to be set based on trading volume, As discussed infra at note 253, this may suggest that the
listing fees that U.S. exchanges charge foreign firms should be increased.
237. For example, the NYSE has sought to convince the SEC to permit it to list issuers
that do not comply with U.S. GAAP and has waived corporate governance standards that it
requires in the case of domestic companies. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
238. Hence, so-called "tag along" rights profoundly restrict the controlling
shareholder's ability to receive such a control premium based on its voting power because
such rights entitle all shareholders (whether or not they have voting rights) to share
proportionally in the premium.
239. Bloomfield & O'Hara, supra note 9, at 448-52.
240. Id. at 426; see also Gordon Gemmill, Transparency and Liquidity: A Study of
Block Trades on the London Stock Exchange Under Different Publication Rules, 51J. Fin.
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grated from Paris to London that the Paris Bourse was eventually com-
pelled to change its trade reporting rules to match those of London.
2 4'
These objections do not imply, however, that the world will remain
static; rather, they suggest that there are institutional rigidities that re-
forms will have to accommodate.
C. Combining the Scenarios: A Mixed World of "High and Low Disclosure"
Assume for a moment that the controlling shareholders of many
listed issuers outside the United States and the United Kingdom would
prefer to enjoy the private benefits of control, rather than maximize their
market valuations through bonding. On this assumption, can additional
"high disclosure" markets emerge? Of course, we have already witnessed
the appearance of "high disclosure" exchanges in Europe and Latin
America in the forms of the Neuer Markt and the Novo Mercado. 242 But
their creation proves the point that old markets will resist change. Pre-
cisely because the Deutsche Boerse, the parent of the Neuer Markt, and
BOVESPA, the parent of the Novo Mercado, were unwilling or unable to
upgrade significantly their own listing standards, they instead founded
new markets, in one case as a wholly-owned subsidiary and in the other as
a special listing section. In so doing, they offered an additional alterna-
tive to their clients without forcing any listed firm to change its govern-
ance or face delisting. This approach is likely to be repeated.
For those firms that do list on a Neuer Markt, Novo Mercado, or
some similar infant exchange, the rationale for listing will be essentially
that the expected gains to their controlling shareholders-i.e., their pro
rata share of the gains that result from being able to finance "high
growth" investment opportunities with equity capital-exceeds the ex-
pected losses-i.e., their forgone private benefits of control. Typically,
cross-listing firns will be companies with high growth prospects that re-
quire equity capital because they are already highly leveraged.2 4"3 Pagano,
Roell, and Zechner report that this was basically the profile of European
firms that cross-listed in the United States during the 1986 to 1997 period
that they studied.
244
High growth prospects are not the only reason that a firm might
migrate to a "high disclosure" exchange, even at the cost to its controlling
shareholders of forgoing some of the private benefits of control that they
previously enjoyed. An alternative scenario starts from the fact that, as
the worldwide barriers to product market competition have fallen, firms
are increasingly forced either to grow to global scale or to accept the fate
1765, 1766-67 (1996) (explaining how delayed publication created a tendency for large
transactions to gravitate towards the least transparent available market).
241. Bloomfield & O'Hara, supra note 9, at 426.
242. See supra notes 189-208 and accompanying text.
243. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz emphasize this example as the principal reason for
non-U.S. issuers to migrate to U.S. exchanges. Doidge et al., supra note 84, at 9.
244. Pagano et aL., supra note 21, at 2.
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of being acquired by a competitor. 245 For example, an auto maker based
in Sweden or Germany faced the choice, after the integration of the Eu-
ropean market, of either expanding its activities to a European-wide scale
or expecting that its rivals that did so would soon dwarf it and realize
probable economies of scale and scope. The most ambitious firms in the
industry might even expand to become worldwide manufacturers, as
clearly some U.S., German, and Japanese producers have done. The
quickest, most logical mechanism for expansion to global scale is the
cross-border merger or acquisition. This scenario principally fits many
European firms that have recently cross-listed in the United States, while
in contrast, emerging markets firms that have cross-listed generally have
been smaller and motivated more by the desire to finance high growth
opportunities.
On this playing field of cross-border mergers, firms with dispersed
ownership that are listed on "high disclosure" exchanges have a distinct
advantage. Their stock will predictably trade at less of a discount to re-
flect the lesser prospect of expropriation by controlling shareholders.
Other things being equal, they will find it easier to make acquisitions with
equity securities. To be sure, firms with concentrated ownership can
make acquisitions for cash, but there may be a ceiling on the magnitude
of cash acquisitions that are feasible. For example, one has difficulty im-
agining Daimler acquiring Chrysler for $50 billion in cash; hence, the
prior decision of Daimler to list on the NYSE may have been a necessary
prerequisite to effectuating this transaction. Other recent large acquisi-
tions (including British Petroleum's 1999 acquisition of Amoco for $48
billion, Ford's purchase of Volvo, and the Exxon/Mobil merger) also
seem to strain the limits of practical finance if these were attempted as
cash transactions. The point is not simply that stock-for-stock acquisitions
are easier, but that firms that maximize the value of their publicly held
shares can make acquisitions at less dilutive costs to themselves. As a re-
sult, firms listed on "high disclosure" exchanges are more likely to be the
survivors and acquirers, rather than the targets, in the wave of acquisi-
tions that the drive for global scale entails. In fact, the parade of large
German firms recently listing on the NYSE evidences the fact that corpo-
rations seeking global scale perceive the need for a listing on a "high
disclosure" exchange.
24 6
Even if "high disclosure" exchanges can thus attract listings from
high growth or acquisition oriented companies, and even if some control-
ling shareholders would willingly abandon some private benefits of con-
trol to achieve these ends, one practical issue remains: Has the United
States already monopolized the market for "high disclosure" exchanges?
The weak response to the creation of the Novo Mercado may suggest that
other new entrants will similarly find it hard to compete against the
245. The author has made this argument at length elsewhere and will not embellish it
here. See Coffee, The Future As History, supra note 15, at 676-82.
246. Id. at 677 & n.129.
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strong "reputational brands" of the NYSE and Nasdaq. Still, a residual
market may remain to the extent that many issuers cannot satisfy the list-
ing standards of the NYSE or Nasdaq or find a U.S. listing too costly.
24 7
In this light, regional "super-markets" might develop from exchanges
that already have relatively high disclosure standards and could offer
greater credibility to companies incorporated in jurisdictions perceived
by investors as having weak governance standards. Conversely, firms less
interested in attracting minority investors, but still desiring some degree
of liquidity, might trade only on lower disclosure exchanges, such as the
Korean or Shanghai Stock Exchanges.
This prediction has two implications: First, "high" and "low disclo-
sure" exchanges could both persist, each attracting a different core con-
stituency of issuers. Second, the fiercest competition will likely be be-
tween those regional exchanges that aspire to attract dual listings from
issuers originally listed on smaller exchanges. For example, the Austra-
lian and Singapore exchanges in Asia and the LSE and Euronext in Eu-
rope are natural competitors. Although single country exchanges will
probably endure in large market countries (such as the Korean or Milan
exchanges), they seem likely to lose trading volume progressively to the
regional "super-market." Exchanges in small market countries (i.e., many
of the transitional stock exchanges) will either close, consolidate, or be
subsidized by their respective states. Whatever the outcome, they will lose
liquidity.
If some exchanges wish to upgrade their disclosure standards to at-
tract listings, or to organize a subsidiary market that does so, what specific
reforms should they adopt? The Neuer Markt has already shown that
quarterly reporting and the use of U.S. GAAP or LAS can be required.
Beyond these obvious requirements, institutional investors will probably
most want "tag along" rights: namely, the right to share on proportionate
terms in any control premium. Both the recent Mexican reforms and a
similar, although largely unsuccessful, legislative struggle in Brazil indi-
cate that this is the corporate governance reform that most divides con-
trolling shareholders and institutional shareholders. 248 Effectively, con-
ferring this right reduces the significance of the disparity between cash
flow and voting rights that characterize many firms in emerging
markets.
24 9
247. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer conclude that "a New York listing is
prohibitively expensive for many companies." La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership, supra
note 15, at 512. If so, regional exchanges have a niche.
248. See supra notes 211-229 and accompanying text. Brazil's less successful efforts
at legislative reform are described in Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 164, at 10-i.
249. Assume that a firm has both Class A and Class B shares and that only the Class A
shares have voting rights, while the cash flow rights belong 25% to Class A and 75% to
Class B. Today, an acquiring corporation would logically direct its control premium
exclusively to the holders of the Class A shares. But if "tag along" rights exist, either under
the corporation's charter or applicable law, this premium would have to be shared with the
Class B shareholders, with the same premium paid to all. This reform could cost the Class
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Is it realistic to expect exchanges outside the Untied States to at-
tempt to adopt anything resembling the NYSE's old "one share, one vote"
rule? Although both the Novo Mercado and the Mexican Stock Ex-
change have done so, it is uncertain whether other exchanges will follow.
Put differently, so long as the NYSE allows foreign firms to list their non-
voting shares on it, there may be little willingness on the part of cross-
listing foreign firms to upgrade their substantive corporate governance.
D. Other Competitors: Who Else Can Offer Bonding Services?
Few of the functions performed by securities exchanges are inher-
ently beyond the capacity of other institutions. In fact, competitive substi-
tutes have developed in some markets for certain of the traditional ser-
vices performed by exchanges.2 5 ° In this light, if exchanges do provide
bonding services, it does not follow that they have a natural monopoly
which others cannot effectively challenge. Conceivably, competitors
could emerge who could provide the same or a similar signaling function
at lower cost. But who else could enter this field? Phrased differently,
who besides an exchange can credibly assure investors that a foreign cor-
poration possesses adequate governance protections to safeguard minor-
ity investors from expropriation? The answer is almost certainly that
others could perform this function, but whether such new entrants will in
fact emerge remains very speculative.
One conceivable candidate to challenge the traditional exchange
might be the "Electronic Communications Network" (ECN), 2 5 1 but it is
unlikely to perform this role. Although these electronic markets have
captured an impressive share of overall trading volume, they have essen-
tially followed an old competitive strategy: Free ride on the price discov-
ery process conducted by traditional exchanges, but offer lower cost and
faster executions. 25 2 This strategy may capture trading volume, but free-
riding does not position ECNs to offer bonding services or other reputa-
A shareholders 75% of the premium that would otherwise have gone to them alone and
will predictably be resisted by them.
250. Jonathan Macey and Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange As a Firm: The
Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 Cornell
L. Rev. 1007, 1010-24 (1990) (arguing that the traditional functions of a stock exchange
can be unbundled so that competition can develop for these individual services).
251. Essentially, ECNs are less regulated electronic markets that are not required to
register or qualify as exchanges under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. They are,
however, required by the SEC to register as broker-dealers under the same act. The term
"Electronic Communications Network" is defined in Rule 1 lAcl-1 (8) under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Dissemination of quotations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1lAcl-1 (8) (2002).
By recent estimates, ECNs now handle roughly 45% of the trading on Nasdaq, but a much
lower percentage of the trading on the NYSE. Kate Kelly, SEC Clears New Nasdaq Trading
Platform, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at Cl (finding that ECNs' share of Nasdaq trading is
45%, Nasdaq's share is 30%, and remaining 25% is internalized by major brokerage firms).
252. This strategy was followed by the Consolidated Stock and Petroleum Exchange




tional benefits. First, ECNs do not have listing standards of their own, but
simply trade stocks that are listed elsewhere. Second, because ECNs are
not good liquidity providers, they cannot cope with large blocks because
they have little capacity to adjust their prices for such blocks or, more
generally, to handle price discovery when a large block hits the market.
As a result, ECNs are likely to be only a secondary market, and not the
primary market, for most companies. In particular, ECNs are unsuited to
handle companies that trade inactively or sporadically because ECNs only
provide matching of buy and sell orders and not the residual liquidity
offered by dealers or specialists.
The real significance of ECNs is that they represent one more com-
petitor that can trade securities that are listed on a high quality exchange.
Thus, as in the earlier discussed case of trading that flows back to the
home country, ECNs erode the incentive for an exchange to invest in
reputational capital or to maintain high listing standards if the exchange
cannot fully capture the trading in that security.2 53 For example, if a for-
eign corporation were to list on the NYSE but still trade 50% on its home
country exchange and 25% on ECNs, then the NYSE might well have
conferred a reputational benefit on the foreign company, but it would
capture only 25% of the trading. This mismatch means the NYSE may be
tinder-motivated to offer bonding services because such listings may not
attract revenues if the trading stays in, or flows back to, the foreign is-
suer's home jurisdiction.
254
In this light, the greater potential challenge to exchanges will more
likely come not from ECNs, but from investment banking firms. The
most realistic alternative to the contemporary pattern of corporate issuers
cross-listing on international exchanges is for large, world-class brokerage
firms to cross borders to search out attractive investments for their cli-
ents. 255 Potentially, either the issuer on the sell side or the broker on the
buy side can today cross borders to link investors with issuers. If brokers
will do so, issuers can stay at home and avoid the costs of cross-listing.
Thus, the issue from a transaction cost perspective becomes: Who can
cross borders more cheaply?
253. One partial answer to this problem is to charge higher listing fees to foreign
firms than domestic firms, in part because foreign firms gain more from U.S. listings than
do domestic firms and in part because more of their trading volume is likely to be diverted
elsewhere.
254. Much depends on the extent of flow back. While trading in the shares of DCX
shifted dramatically to Frankfurt following the Daimler-Benz merger with Chrysler, see
supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text, the reverse has been true recently in Latin
America. See supra notes 55-64, 69-70 and accompanying text. If flow back is less likely
in the case of emerging markets, there might be a greater incentive for U.S. exchanges to
market bonding services to such issuers.
255. Today, modern information technology enables the global brokerage firm to
execute orders quickly around the world. For a description of this process, see Karmin et
al., Vision Test, supra note 1.
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Because cross-listing can be expensive (both in terms of listing ex-
penses and the reconciliation of financial statements), the intuitive an-
swer to this question would seem to be that the broker can cross borders
more cheaply than can issuers.2 56 Moreover, the broker has a natural
ally: the traditional exchange that today faces the risk that it will lose
substantial order flow to a more liquid market when its listed companies
cross-list elsewhere. The logical strategy for these traditional exchanges
that cannot or will not upgrade their corporate governance standards is
to solicit international brokerage firms to trade on them by making them-
selves cheaper, and hence more attractive, to these brokerage firms.
Rather than raise listing standards, such exchanges could seek to reduce
costs to attract international brokers and thereby similarly break down
market segmentations.
But even if such an alliance is possible, what relevance does it have
for any future competition to provide bonding services? The answer is
that brokerage firms could potentially provide the assurances that foreign
portfolio investors demand through the stable of securities analysts that
they employ. This strategy would require: first, that the foreign firm
adopt charter and/or bylaw provisions that protect minority sharehold-
ers, including a commitment to "high disclosure;" and second, that secur-
ities analysts be capable of verifying the adequacy of such private, self-
help efforts. If this were possible, foreign firms would not need to cross-
list; instead, global brokerage firms would focus the attention of their
securities analysts on selected foreign stocks that they expect to trade
globally. This 3cenario is plausible precisely because analyst attention has
long been a key attraction luring foreign issuers to list on U.S. exchanges.
On cross-listing, a foreign firm receives greater analyst coverage and fore-
casts of its future earnings become correspondingly more accurate rela-
tive to those made with respect to firms that do not cross-list.25 7 These
are important advantages to the firm, but to the extent that such analyst
attention can be achieved without cross-listing, the foreign issuer has an
obvious incentive to use the less costly alternative in order to bond its
implicit promise not to expropriate minority investors. In short, analyst
attention and cross-listing are not inextricably linked, and the former can
potentially be achieved without the latter. If so, an alliance between bro-
kers and foreign firms to trade on less costly exchanges offers gains to
both and thus constitutes the gravest threat to more costly, "high disclo-
sure" exchanges.
256. Some evidence suggests that brokers are already overtaking exchanges in making
foreign securities accessible to investors within their jurisdiction. Professor Howell Jackson
and Eric Pan report that brokers in Europe have developed cross-border linkages between
markets that "have reduced the need of European issuers to make special efforts to reach
retail investors in other European countries." Jackson & Pan, supra note 13, at 655. Thus,
rather than a French issuer listing on the LSE, it can rely on British brokers directly placing
orders for its stock on the Paris Bourse through French brokers for its British retail
investors. See id. at 656 n.2.
257. Lang et al., supra note 95, at 20.
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This potential approach does, however, shift costs in a manner that
may not necessarily be attractive to the brokerage firm. Although the
issuer avoids the costs of both establishing a depository receipts facility in
the United States and listing on a U.S. exchange, the broker incurs (and
must pass on, to some degree, to its customers) the costs of foreign exe-
cution, clearance, and settlement. On the other side of the ledger, how-
ever, the broker captures trading that might have otherwise gone to an
ECN if the firm had instead cross-listed in the United States. Hence, al-
though the broker may incur some increased costs, the net balance is
uncertain. Over the long run, cost differences should be determinative,
and any cost differential favoring brokers should reduce the issuer's in-
centive to cross-list. This point has a further implication: If the driving
force behind cross-listing were only the desire to break down market seg-
mentation, one would logically expect that the cheaper means to this end
would be through international executions by global brokerage firms,
which can specialize in this activity, rather than through each issuer list-
ing globally. In this light, the trend toward cross-listing again suggests
that the market segmentation hypothesis cannot fully explain this
phenomenon.
A further difference between bonding through cross-listing and the
use of international brokerage firms to design and verify corporate gov-
ernance reforms on an individualized basis is that, in the latter case, the
issuer does not expose itself to litigation in the United States (either by
private plaintiffs or by the SEC). This difference raises the question of
whether bonding can occur in the absence of a strong enforcement
mechanism. Clearly, issuers would prefer to offer the promise of better
disclosure without also incurring the heightened risk of litigation. But
can issuers have one without the other? Those who doubt that securities
class actions achieve much will argue that improved governance can
come without increased litigation, and those who disagree will note that
alternative means to bonding have never developed (even though they
may be cheaper).2518 At present, whether bonding requires exposure to
litigation is a debatable but unanswerable question.
Subject to this caveat, the bottom line is that rival strategies are possi-
ble and thus may lead exchanges increasingly to polarize and signal very
different strategies. Some exchanges will "race for the top" in the man-
ner of the Neuer Market and the Novo Mercado, while others should
increasingly pursue a cost-minimization strategy. Those opting for the
latter approach may focus also on speed of settlement and seek a reputa-
tion for relative regulatory flexibility. Conceivably, issuers that did cross-
list on a high quality exchange might also deliberately maintain their list-
ing on a lower quality market in order to escape regulatory oversight for
258. Arguably, the Neuer Markt's controversy-plagued recent history may suggest to
some that enhanced disclosure without increased enforcement does not succeed, or at
least produces predictable waves of scandals. See supra notes 189-199 and accompanying
text.
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some transactions in which their controlling shareholders wished to
engage.
V. POLICY ISSUES: How SHOULD REGULATORY COMPETITION
BE STRUCTURED?
The efforts by emerging markets to develop new "high disclosure"
markets and to upgrade their corporate governance standards is moti-
vated both by the obvious desire to spur economic development and by
the equally obvious fear that, in the absence of reform, their securities
markets will wither away as trading migrates to international exchanges.
These efforts are complicated, however, by a long-standing position of
the U.S. exchanges and the SEC: They do not require foreign firms that
list in the United States to satisfy the same listing requirements as domes-
tic firms.25 9 As a result, when a foreign market, such as the Novo Mer-
cado, seeks to upgrade its governance standards, it encounters resistance
(or at least apathy) from its audience of potential listed companies that
know they can list in the United States and obtain both greater liquidity
and lower governance requirements. The unwillingness of U.S. ex-
changes to impose governance or voting listing requirements on foreign
listed firms thus surfaces as a barrier to improved governance in emerg-
ing markets; indeed, it may create a perverse form of regulatory competi-
tion in which U.S. exchanges in effect underbid their competitors in
terms of substantive governance requirements. This section will first ex-
amine the special status of foreign listed companies on U.S. exchanges
and then turn to the broader question of regulatory competition.
A. The Domestic/Foreign Listing Disparity
Listing standards were pioneered by the NYSE as a means of creating
"a brand name associated with high quality."260 While its early listing
standards primarily related to financial disclosures, the NYSE began to
adopt substantive corporate governance standards in the early twentieth
century and effectively imposed its famous "one share, one vote" listing
standard in 1926.261 Over time, the NYSE has similarly adopted listing
rules requiring (1) an independent audit committee, 262 (2) shareholder
259. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
260. ABA Special Study, supra note 97, at 9.
261. Id. at 11; see also Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights:
The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 687, 693-97
(1986) (discussing events leading up to NYSE's adoption of one share, one vote rule).
262. New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual § 303.01 (1999) [hereinafter
NYSE Manual]; see also ABA Special Study, supra note 97, at 23-26 (surveying various
listing rules that have been used by NYSE, Nasdaq, and Amex). The NYSE rules largely




approval of certain stock option plans, 263" and (3) shareholder approval
of issuances of 20% or more of a listed company's common stock in order
to protect shareholders against dilutive issuances. 2 64 Today, both the
NYSE and Nasdaq restrict listed companies from disparately reducing or
restricting, through any corporate action or stock issuance, the voting
rights of existing shareholders of common stock.2 65 All of these provi-
sions were intended to protect minority shareholders and most go be-
yond the requirements of state corporate law.
Yet under each of the NYSE, the Amex, and Nasdaq rules, foreign
issuers are effectively exempt from these provisions.2 66 Moreover, the
SEC has approved this disparity.2 67 Why has this disparity in the treat-
ment of foreign and domestic issuers developed? The principal reason
was probably that, at the time the SEC approved this distinction in 1987,
foreign issuers represented only a small fraction of both the securities
listed or traded on U.S. exchanges. 268 Thus, if only 5% of a foreign com-
pany's stock traded on all U.S. exchanges, it seemed disproportionate to
require such a firm to observe the NYSE's "one share, one vote" rule;
indeed, application of such a rule might discourage foreign listings. Ad-
ditionally, an inevitable issue of cultural relativism surfaces here: If for-
eign corporations frequently use non-voting stock or if they consider au-
dit committees to be incompatible with the two-tier board structure
common to most civil law countries, the SEC and the NYSE arguably were
less justified in overruling these firms in their use of local corporate gov-
ernance practices than they were in imposing local best practices on U.S.
firms.2 69 Given these arguments, foreign issuers were broadly permitted
to obtain a waiver from most NYSE corporate governance listing require-
ments, so long as an independent attorney licensed in the issuer's home
263. ABA Special Study, supra note 97, at 21-23. An important exception, whose
scope currently remains unresolved, exists for "broad-based option plans" that include
both officers and non-officer employees. At present, the SEC appears to be pushing all the
exchanges to adopt a common consensus position. Id.
264. NYSE Manual, supra note 262, § 312.03(c); see also ABA Special Study, supra
note 97, at 24.
265. NYSE Manual, supra note 262, § 313.00. The National Association of Securities
Dealers takes the same position with regard to Nasdaq. National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., Manual Rule 4351, at 5336 (2001).
266. See ABA Special Study, supra note 97, at 26-27.
267. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 24,634, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (june 23, 1987).
268. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text (contrasting percentages in 1990
and 2000). Also, investors who purchased ADRs were thought to care little about voting
rights, because such rights were procedurally difficult to exercise in the case of ADRs.
269. The German two-tier board structure differs dramatically from the structure of
the Anglo-American board of directors. Essentially, it consists of a lower or "managing
board" that runs the business and is composed exclusively of inside executives and an
Lipper or "supervisory board," which monitors the managing board and is half elected by
shareholders and half by employees and labor. For an overview, see ThomasJ. Andre,Jr.,
Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance: A Glimpse at German Supervisory
Boards, 70 TIl. L. Rev. 1819, 1820-30 (1996).
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country opined that the firm's governance practices were not prohibited
in its home jurisdiction.
270
Even at this time, the result was a sharp disparity between the NYSE's
mandatory approach to domestic firms and its laissez-faire approach to
foreign firms. Since that point, however, much has changed. Foreign
issuers now account for nearly 17% of the NYSE listings, not the 2% to
3% level of the 1980s.2 7 1 More importantly, many foreign issuers now
trade principally in the United States. 2 72 For these issuers, the burden no
longer seems disproportionate. In addition, if the purpose of the listing
rules is investor protection, it is hard to understand why investors trading
on U.S. exchanges need or deserve more protection in the case of U.S.-
incorporated companies and less in the case of foreign-incorporated issu-
ers. If anything, the latter class of companies presents higher risks.
Finally, exempting all foreign issuers on an across-the-board basis un-
dercuts the efforts of those foreign exchanges, including both the Novo
Mercado and the Mexican Stock Exchange, that are seeking to upgrade
corporate governance through higher listing standards, as this exemption
enables the foreign issuer to evade domestic governance-related stan-
dards by listing on a U.S. exchange. 273 In effect, given its size and posi-
tion, the U.S. market becomes the regulatory price setter, with its relaxed
standards for foreign issuers placing a ceiling on the standards that local
exchanges can impose on their constituent firms.
274
These arguments have had some modest impact on the NYSE, but
not enough. In the wake of Enron and growing investor skepticism, the
NYSE has proposed to upgrade its listing standards in a number of re-
spects, 275 but with regard to foreign issuers, its only reform proposal has
been to "[r] equire listed foreign private issuers to disclose any significant
ways in which their corporate governance practices differ from those fol-
lowed by domestic companies under NYSE listing standards."2 76 While
such disclosure may be useful, it would still permit a foreign listed com-
270. ABA Special Study, supra note 97, at 27.
271. See supra text and table accompanying note 46.
272. This is true both for Latin American and Israeli companies. See supra notes
55-59, 73-76 and accompanying text.
273. This phenomenon is not limited to Latin America. Professor Amir Licht has
reached a similar conclusion about the impact of U.S. stock market standards on the
efforts of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange to upgrade its governance standards, which efforts
were undercut, he concludes, by the "watered-down" standards that U.S. exchanges made
applicable to foreign issuers. Amir N. Licht, David's Dilemma: A Case Study of Securities
Regulation in a Small Open Market, 2 Theoretical Inquiries L. 673, 675 (2001).
274. This is also Professor Licht's express finding. Id. at 674-75.
275. See NYSE, Corporate Accountability & Listing Standards Committee Report
(June 6, 2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/about/report.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). This report was prepared at the request of SEC Chairman Harvey
Pitt and proposes a number of useful and in some cases significant reforms, which are
beyond this Article's scope.
276. Id. at 22.
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pany-but not a domestic one-to reduce retroactively the voting rights
of non-controlling shareholders.
The appropriate compromise here does not require treating all for-
eign issuers identically to U.S. companies. Rather, the practical test
might look to the volume of trading in the United States. If the foreign
issuer has a higher level of trading in the United States than on any non-
U.S. exchange, 2 77 then such an issuer should not be able to escape U.S.
listing standards that are intended to protect the investors who trade on
U.S. exchanges. 2 78 Conversely, if the issuer listed ADRs on the NYSE that
account for, say, only 10% of its total trading, the United States has less
justification for seeking to impose its standards on that security, as it has
only a limited presence in U.S. markets. This proposed standard also rec-
ognizes that there could someday develop substantive differences be-
tween what two exchanges in differentjurisdictions require, thereby mak-
ing it impossible to comply with both.
Above all, this approach would end the prospect that U.S. markets
will entice cross-listing firms to make better and more detailed disclosure,
but still permit them to utilize non-voting stock in order to preserve the
private benefits of control for its controlling shareholders. Such an out-
come might attract cross-listings, but it would not benefit U.S. investors.
B. The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
If the NYSE and the SEC have assiduously avoided imposing govern-
ance requirements on foreign issuers, Congress has just done precisely
the opposite and imposed sweeping governance reforms on both foreign
and domestic issuers that are listed on U.S. markets. The Public Com-
pany Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (popularly
known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, after its co-sponsors), requires listed
companies to upgrade their disclosures and governance in a number of
respects, 27 9 but its most important and sweeping revision is its require-
277. A bright-line rule could simply look to whether the majority of the trading occurs
in the United States.
278. This Article does not consider the SEC's authority to mandate listing standards
for foreign companies that are equivalent, or at least similar, to domestic companies,
because in part the current SEC would have little interest in mandating standards for the
NYSE (or any other exchange). Although the SEC has broad authority under
section 19(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000), to amend
the NYSE's rules, a significant obstacle is the D.C. Circuit's decision in Business Roundtable
v. SEC, which held that the SEC lacked authority to impose a "one share, one vote" listing
standard on all exchanges. 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990). That case was, however,
grounded on principles of federalism, which require deference to state corporate law.
These same principles do not logically apply (or at the least do not apply as forcefully) in
the case of the foreign issuer, because deference to foreign corporate law is in no sense
implicit in our constitutional scheme of federalism.
279. Among the principal provisions of the Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act of 2002 (the Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, that would
impose new requirements on foreign issuers are the following: (1) section 301 ("Public
company audit committees") (mandating audit committees composed exclusively of
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ment of independent audit committees. 28 0 Although this was not a major
change for most U.S. companies, it represents a revolutionary reform for
corporations incorporated under civil law regimes, because civil law
codes often require a two-tier board, with the lower or "managing board"
having no independent directors and the upper or "supervisory board"
being half composed of representatives of employees. As a result, be-
cause codetermination laws staff the supervisory board with employee
and union representatives, civil law corporations have generally resisted
giving the supervisory board significant substantive responsibilities.2 8 1
Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is particularly threatening to many Euro-
pean firms precisely because it assigns to the audit committee all respon-
sibility "for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of
any registered public accounting firm employed by that issuer (including
directors meeting a statutory standard of independence); (2) section 302 ("Corporate
responsibility for financial reports") (requiring sworn declarations from senior financial
officers); (3) section 303 ("Improper influence on conduct of audits") (criminalizing
actions to "coerce, manipulate, or mislead" the firm's auditors); (4) section 304
("Forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits") (requiring forfeiture of incentive or equity
compensation received, or stock trading profits made, during the initial twelve month
period covered by an earnings restatement); (5) section 306 ("Insider trades during
pension fund black-out periods") (restricting the ability of directors and executive officers
to sell during certain "black-out" periods when holders of individual account plans are
prohibited from trading); (6) section 307 ("Rules of professional responsibility for
attorneys") (requiring securities'attorneys to report "a material violation of securities law
or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation" to chief legal counsel, chief executive
officer, and, under specified circumstances, to board of directors); and (7) section 402
("Enhanced conflict of interest provisions") (barring most loans by firms to their corporate
executives).
280. Section 301 overshadows the other sections of the Act because many of these
other provision have little impact on foreign corporations. For example, foreign issuers do
not typically make loans to their executives, or have "black-out" periods; hence, sections
402 and 306, respectively, will have less bite in their case. Although section 304 will make
earnings restatements more costly for executives in all firms, foreign issuers have generally
not been as frequently forced by their auditors to make earnings restatements. Nor are
foreign attorneys as apt to feel compelled to report misconduct to their firm's board,
because they do not regularly practice before the SEC and hence do not fear suspension by
it.
281. Under German law, for example, the supervisory board (or Aufsichtsrat) is
expected to appoint and, if necessary, remove the corporation's managing board (or
Vorstand), which consists of its principal executive officers, but the supervisory board does
not make or review most business decisions. Under the Co-Determination Act of 1976,
supervisory boards of companies with 2,000 or more employees must have an equal
number of representatives of shareholders and labor. Thomas J. Andr6, Jr., Cultural
Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies to
Germany, 73 Tul. L. Rev. 69, 84-85 (1998). Thus, the supervisory board is only half
shareholder-elected and is not an organ necessarily committed to the shareholders'
interests. Some critics have also reported that the "supervisory board has never been
strong.... The board is not a serious monitoring mechanism inside the firm." Mark J.
Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 Stan. L.
Rev. 539, 548 (2000). Roe further suggests that shareholders do not wish to delegate
enhanced powers to the supervisory board because to do so would only strengthen "labor's
voice and authority inside the firm." Id. at 568.
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resolution of disagreements between management and the auditor re-
garding financial reporting) ."282 Furthermore, although some modest
exemptive authority is provided, 28 3 the Act precludes members of the au-
dit committee from receiving any compensation from the company
(other than their directors' fees).284 The net result is a mismatch for civil
law corporations: Members of the managing board are barred from ser-
vice on the audit committees, and members of the supervisory board,
who may also be conflicted, are given powers that few civil law corpora-
tions would willingly entrust to them.
What will be the response of foreign issuers to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act? Some could delist,2 8 5 but it is a far more difficult decision to delist
(and thereby abandon existing shareholders) than to decline to list in the
first place. Yet, for those firms hoping to raise equity financing, make
U.S. acquisitions, or bond their promise to make credible disclosures, this
may not be an attractive option, as the need to satisfy these priorities may
require them to adapt the audit committee, incongruent as it is, to their
own very different governance system. 28 6 Some form of accommodation,
therefore, seems desirable that would permit foreign corporations, or at
least those in civil lawjurisdictions that mandate two-tier boards, to utilize
an alternative procedure for enhancing the credibility of their account-
282. Section 301 of the Act amends section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78f) by adding a new section (in) (2) thereto, which contains the quoted
language.
283. See section 301 of the Act, which adds new section 10A(m)(3)(C) to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to permit the Commission to exempt from the
independence requirements of section 10A(m)(3)(B) "a particular relationship with
respect to audit committee members."
284. See section 301 of the Act, which adds new section 10A(m) (3) (B) to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit an audit committee member from receiving
"any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee from the issuer." The problem with
this language as applied to the managing board of civil law corporations with two-tier
boards is that they are entirely insiders; in addition, even the shareholder-elected members
of the supervisory board often have close economic ties to the corporation and its
controlling shareholders. Finally, the labor representatives on the supervisory board by
definition receive salaries from the corporation, which would disqualify them, unless
exempted by the SEC.
285. Some twenty-four German corporations, including DaimlerChrysler, Bayer, and
Deutsche Telekom, have written the SEC to request an exemption from the Act, and one
firm, Porsche, has suspended its plans to list on the NYSE. See Mark Landler, Porsche Is
Balking at U.S. Auditing Rule, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 2002, at WI. It is far from clear,
however, that the SEC has the authority to grant the requested exemption.
286. The real deficiency in the extension of the audit committee to most European
firms is that the audit committee was designed to monitor management, which is the
essential monitoring problem under common law systems of dispersed ownership. Yet, in
the system of concentrated ownership that characterizes most civil law jurisdictions,
controlling shareholders naturally perform that function. Instead, the need tinder a
system of concentrated ownership is for an organ that can monitor the controlling
shareholders. To the extent that the controlling shareholders elect half of the supervisory
board, such directors are hardly independent of them.
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ing policies and results. 287 The bottom line is that U.S. policy towards
foreign issuers seeking to cross-list into the United States is now entirely
unrationalized, with the most incompatible provisions of U.S. corporate
governance for the foreign issuer (e.g., the independent audit commit-
tee) having been made mandatory, while less difficult, but more impor-
tant, provisions (e.g., the prohibition on derogation of voting rights) re-
main inapplicable.
C. Regulatory Competition Reconsidered
This Article has recognized that some forms of regulatory competi-
tion may be desirable. For example, the higher disclosure and govern-
ance standards adopted by both the Neuer Markt and the Novo Mercado
are clearly the product of a competitive desire to attract listings. In addi-
tion, recent legislation adopted in Latin America clearly seems intended
to upgrade local corporate governance in order to stem the migration of
trading and listings abroad.28 8 But if these forms of regulatory competi-
tion are desirable, why should we not go further and adopt the "issuer
choice" approach that several commentators have endorsed under which
an issuer could trade on any exchange using the disclosure and govern-
ance standards of any recognized jurisdiction? 289 This Article presents
three brief reasons for rejecting "issuer choice" and then describes an
alternative model to issuer choice that it calls "exitless" regulatory
competition:
1. Complementarity. - Because investors do not evaluate individual
stocks in isolation, but rather compare them, it is desirable that any mar-
ket have a set of common standards and rules that facilitates investor
comparison. Under "issuer choice," one U.S.-incorporated company
could adopt Italian accounting and disclosure standards; another Greek;
and a third, Korean. While each set of standards may be internally consis-
tent, they are not externally comparable. Hence, these three companies
could have performed very similarly, but appear very different. The claim
here is not that one set of accounting standards is necessarily superior to
another, but that a common standard is better than diverse and non-com-
parable standards.2911 Similarly, the spread of English as the language of
business does not reflect the natural superiority of English, but rather the
natural desirability of a common standard language. To be sure, markets
287. The most practical solution for the short run would be to exempt the supervisory
board, or any committee thereof, from section 301's independence requirements.
Alternatively, the SEC might permit special outside monitors to review with the
corporation's auditors its accounting policies and results (this would enable corporations
subject to co-determination laws from having to negotiate with their labor representatives).
288. See supra notes 209-229 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
290. The author has discussed this theme elsewhere at greater length. See Coffee,
The Future as History, supra note 15, at 692-97.
2002] 1827
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
can function without such a common standard, but they are less transpar-
ent and more costly for investors to use.
2. Strong Laws Encourage Economic Development. - The available em-
pirical evidence suggests that adopting and enforcing a prohibition
against insider trading significantly reduces the cost of capital. 29 1 Such a
finding is consistent with the broader proposition advanced by LLS&V
and others that strong laws protecting minority investors are a precondi-
tion to financial development. 29 2 Given this evidence, consider now the
impact of the "issuer choice" approach to securities regulation. If issuers
could opt to be governed by a non-U.S. legal regime, even though they
were listed on the NYSE, some might well opt for the law of a jurisdiction
that does not prohibit insider trading. Proponents of "issuer choice" will,
of course, respond that an issuer that did so would be penalized by the
market and would experience an appropriate discount in its share value.
Perhaps it would, 293 but this does not respond to the more basic point
that an externality has arisen: The immunity conferred on some firms to
engage in insider trading may affect the cost of equity capital for all firms
trading in that market. Rather than research the laws of numerous juris-
dictions, investors may simply assume that they were vulnerable to insid-
ers misappropriating material, nonpublic information and adjust prices
downward in response. Moreover, there is also the prospect that the abil-
ity of some persons to engage in lawful insider trading may induce others
to similarly engage in this behavior, even if it were illegal in their case. In
effect, the moral foundations of the norm against insider trading are
undercut.294
3. Reputational Brands. - The foregoing example involving insider
trading can be generalized to apply to most other forms of disclosure
deficiencies. If some firms are permitted to trade in the market while
making less than the prescribed level of disclosure, there is a potential
effect on other issuers, who may incur a higher cost of equity capital as a
result. Scandals affect not only the subject company, but others listed in
the same market, as the Neuer Markt sadly learned. Essentially, this is
why the NYSE developed listing standards, beginning in the late nine-
teenth century. Put simply, it recognized that to develop a "reputational
brand," it had to exclude those unwilling or unable to comply with its
high quality standards. 295 In short, "issuer choice" is incompatible with
291. See Utpal Bhattachayra & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57
J. Fin. 75, 97 (2002) (finding 7% reduction in cost of equity when insider trading
prohibition is enforced).
292. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
293. That it would experience some discount seems a safe conclusion, but that this
discount would be appropriate to compensate minority investors for the increased risk of
expropriation seems unprovable.
294. The author has argued elsewhere that normative consensus may be the critical
factor underlying "strong" corporate governance. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms
Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2151, 2154-71 (2001).
295. See Coffee, Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 15, at 34-39.
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the idea of a market developing a "high standards" reputation. Yet, only
those markets that have developed such a brand name have developed
into major international market centers with deep liquidity.
Where then is the dividing line between desirable and undesirable
forms of regulatory competition? Proponents of "issuer choice" favor a
form of regulatory arbitrage that is designed to allow firms to escape un-
desired regulation. Such an approach makes sense from a policy perspec-
tive only if one believes firms are systematically subject to overregula-
tion.2 96 In contrast, cross-listing represents an alternative form of
regulatory competition that can be called "exitless" because the issuer
does not escape its home jurisdiction's law and rules and must comply
with any additional standards prescribed by the market on which it cross
lists. Hence, the race can only be in the direction of increased regula-
tion. As a result, this form of regulatory competition can involve bond-
ing, but not a regulatory arbitrage designed to weaken legal rules. At
best, it is desirable; at worst, it is benign.
CONCLUSION
This Article adds to an existing literature that has generally con-
cluded that "law matters" and the strength of legal protections predicts a
company's access to external finance. 297 What that literature misses and
what this Article stresses is the relevance of private action, Law matters
most to those firms needing access to external finance. To the extent
that these firms are incorporated under legal regimes that do not protect
minority rights, private action becomes the necessary (if partial) substi-
tute for stronger law. Cross-listing is ultimately a form of private action
and is most likely to be undertaken by firms seeking access to equity capi-
tal and needing to compensate for weak law in their jurisdictions of incor-
poration. Firms that do not fit this profile are less likely to cross-list (or to
do so for other reasons). Non-cross-listing firms remain indifferent to
this prospect of a higher market valuation for an understandable reason:
296. The "issuer choice" model derives from a theoretical model of jurisdictional
competition for citizens. See Tiebout, supra note 8, at 419-20. This model assumes that
the "consumer-voter" moves to the jurisdiction that best matches the citizen's preferences
for expenditures and taxes. Id. at 419. Obviously, citizens are deterred by high taxes, and
thus the threat of citizen flight deters high taxation. Unlike the citizens in this model,
corporations do not truly leave their jurisdiction when they cross-list on a foreign
exchange. Rather, their shares typically continue to trade on their home exchange, and
they continue to do business in their home jurisdiction, where they have many
shareholders. Because they thus make a "pseudo flight" to a foreign jurisdiction, they are
not comparable to the actors in a Tiebout-style model, and efficient outcomes do not
necessarily result.
297. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text. For the most recent evidence that the
development of a country's legal system predicts access by firms within it to external
finance, see Ash Demirguc-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic, Funding Growth in Bank-based




because any higher market valuation would be offset by reduced private
benefits of control to their controlling shareholders. The firms that do
and do not cross-list thus appear to be as different as proverbial apples
and oranges. As a result, different forms of securities markets, each ca-
tering to a different clientele, appear likely to persist.
Admittedly, ambiguity still surrounds the precise cause of the in-
crease in market valuation associated with cross-listing: Is it the higher
likelihood of legal enforcement, the signal of profitable investment op-
portunities, the more credible promise of improved disclosure, contrac-
tual protections negotiated on entry into the U.S. market, the enhanced
analyst coverage-or all in combination? Cross-listing may in part be a
signaling device that the firm has high growth prospects, in part a bond-
ing mechanism to assure public investors that they will not be exploited,
and in part a means of attaining greater analyst attention and reducing
informational asymmetries. Our understanding of the motives that drive
it is far from complete. Yet, cross-listing cannot continue to be explained
satisfactorily as simply a search for additional sources of capital in a seg-
mented world; nor can the "law matters" thesis continue to ignore the
critical role of private action in choosing among legal regimes.
In an increasingly competitive and consolidating environment, stock
exchanges and other market centers will come under heightened pres-
sure to specialize. Some will move toward the "high disclosure," high
transparency approach that both the NYSE historically and the Neuer
Markt more recently have pursued, while others may persist in following
the "low transparency," cost minimization approach that many European
and Asian stock exchanges have traditionally followed. This Article has
suggested that different exchanges will move in different directions be-
cause of a basic path-dependent fact: They have different clienteles of
listed companies. But even where the principal exchange resists en-
hanced disclosure or governance standards, it may follow the German
and Brazilian examples by forming a "high disclosure" subsidiary or spe-
cial listing segment. In addition, the one destabilizing prospect on the
horizon is that legislation in many jurisdictions may begin to upgrade
governance standards in order to slow the loss of liquidity from the local
market. Here, powerful interest groups may clash.
The legislative reforms that have been provoked by cross-listings are
an example of a new form of regulatory competition in which issuers opt
into higher standards without seeking to escape their local jurisdiction's
law. Such "exitless" competition seems desirable, but it is impeded by the
increasingly inconsistent distinction that U.S. law makes between foreign
and domestic issuers, sometimes applying governance standards to the
latter, but not to the former, and sometimes applying them to both. Al-
though this Article has not advocated specific governance requirements
for any class of issuers, it would argue that functionally similar rules
should apply to both foreign and domestic issuers that principally trade
in the United States. In contrast, "issuer choice" represents a form of
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competition that would largely undercut the ability of markets to develop
their own reputational brands.
Finally, precisely because exchanges today do not capture the full
value of the bonding services that they provide to issuers-both because
of trading flow back and other reasons that divert trading away from ex-
changes-the market for bonding services can fail. That there is a de-
mand for bonding services on the part of issuers does not imply that
there is necessarily an incentive to supply them on the part of those cur-
rently most able to do so (i.e., stock exchanges). Thus, a case exists for
regulatory oversight to protect and preserve the reputational benefits of
exchange listing. The "race to the top" via cross-listing should be en-
couraged-but it will slow if "issuer choice" is permitted.
